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Wednesday Symposium  
Understanding Shame 
Organized by  
Alessandra Fussi  
University of Pisa (Italy) 
 
Self-Disappointment, Deep Self-Disappointment, and Shame 
(Alessandra Fussi – University of Pisa, Italy) 
I will argue for a distinction between three closely related phenomena: self-
disappointment, deep self-disappointment and shame. My thesis is that while self-
disappointment is felt in relation to failures that we do not deem relevant for our 
identity, deep self-disappointment regards failures concerning self-relevant values, 
without a concern for the views of others. Shame, in turn, is felt only when a failure 
concerning self-relevant values is viewed in light of our reputation before others we 
deem important. This point is controversial, because, according to Deonna, 
Rodogno, Teroni (2012), and contrary to a long philosophical tradition — among 
others: Aristotle (in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Rhetoric), Sartre (1943/1977), 
Rawls (1971 /2005), Taylor (1985), Williams (1993), Calhoun (2004), Deigh (1983) — a 
concern for reputation is relevant to shame only when reputation belongs to an 
individual’s self-relevant values. First I will show how the distinction between self-
esteem and self-respect — following Harris (1999) — has a bearing on the distinction 
between self-disappointment and deep self-disappointment. Then I will show how a 
concern for reputation allows us to distinguish between deep self-disappointment 
and shame. 
 
Calhoun, C. (2004). An Apology for Moral Shame. Journal of Political Philosophy 11, 1–20. 
Deigh, J. (1983). Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique. Ethics 93, 225–245. 
Deonna, J.A., R. Rodogno, and F. Teroni (2012). In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an 
Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, G.W. (1999). Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian 
Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kennedy, G.A. trans. 1991. Aristotle: On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 Ostwald, M. trans. 1962. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis-New York: Bobbs-
Merrill. 
Rawls, J. (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sartre, J. P. (1943/1977). Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. 
Secaucus: Citadel Press. 
Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame and Guilt. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williams, B. (1993). Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
 
 
Shame and Heteronomy 
(Raffaele Rodogno – Aarhus University, Denmark) 
A number of commentators have argued that the heteronomy of shame disqualifies 
it from having any moral relevance, or makes it relevant only for primitive forms of 
morality (Adkins 1960, Benedict 1947, Dodds 1951). Their charge is that while 
(mature) morality is an enterprise based on ideals of autonomy, shame is a radically 
heteronomous emotion. On views such as these, in shame, we simply succumb to 
whatever external standards others impose on us by way of the negative judgement 
they pass on us. Shame should therefore not be considered as of much moral 
significance. There are two broad strategies for countering this type of charge. One is 
to deny the autonomous nature of morality (Williams 1993; Calhoun 2004). The other 
is to deny the heteronomous nature of shame (Deonna, Rodogno, Teroni 2011). 
While there are things to be said in favour of both strategies, in this paper I wish to 
tackle this problem more radically by showing that the autonomy/heteronomy 
dichotomy is a false dichotomy when applied to shame. In short, I argue that if we 
want to do justice to the moral life of shame, we have to explain (i) why we do not 
respond with shame but rather with anger, resentment, indignation, disappointment 
or simply with indifference to at least some of the negative judgements passed on us 
(heteronomous judgement is not sufficient for shame); while (ii) we do respond with 
shame to judgements with which we disagree (not all appropriate shame is 
autonomous). I argue that the connection between shame and attachments and the a-
rational nature of the latter explain this riddle. 
 
 
  
Anxiety and the body-for-others: Body dysmorphic disorder  
and the phenomenology of shame  
(David Mitchell – University of Johannesburg, South Africa) 
This paper explores the relationship between phenomenology and the psychological 
condition known as body dysmorphic disorder, or BDD. This is, to explain, a 
disorder in which the sufferer perceives, and is obsessed by, a defect in their 
appearance which is either non-existent or severely exaggerated. And we will argue 
that Sartrean phenomenology can shed light on this phenomenon. In particular, 
drawing on the discussion of the body in Being and Nothingness, we suggest that 
BDD stems from the intensified awareness of a condition of all embodiment. That is 
to say, BDD arises from an intensified sense of the elusiveness of our own bodies 
before our attempt to grasp them. For if we cannot ever truly know our bodies 
directly we look to the perspective of others to help us to do so. And it is this point 
which holds the key to understanding both BDD, and its status as a social anxiety 
disorder. For phenomenology then suggests there is a propensity within 
embodiment itself toward obsession with how one is perceived in the eyes of others. 
In other words, phenomenology suggests a basic project of the human being 
regarding the body which is both necessarily pursued and necessarily frustrated. 
And it is this project then, anxiety producing and obsessional, which allows us to see 
how a condition like BDD arises. Further, it is this analysis of body dysmorphia 
which will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of shame. 
For this analysis enables us to better grasp the connection between the body-for-
others and this type of experience, as well as to see a new direction in which Sartrean 
phenomenology can be developed.  
 
  
  
Thursday Symposium  
The Politics of Resentment and Ressentiment 
 
Organized by  
Mikko Salmela  
University of Helsinki (Finland) 
  Thomas Szanto 
 University of Jyväskylä & University of Copenhagen (Denmark) 
 
Presentations: 
Thomas Szanto (University of Copenhagen & University of Jyväskylä): 
Ressentiment: A Collective Affective Intentionality Account 
Mikko Salmela (University of Helsinki) & Christian von Scheve (FU Berlin): 
Emotional Dynamics of Right-and Left-Wing Political Populism 
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz): Moral Psychology Goes 
Politics: The Dynamics of Tolerance and Ressentiment 
Resentment and Ressentiment are political emotions par excellence. There is 
widespread agreement among social and political scientists that there is an intimate 
link between Ressentiment and populism, especially on the radical right spectrum of 
the electorate (Betz 1994; Demertzis 2006; Berezin 2009; Crociani-Windland & 
Hoggett 2012; Hoggett et al. 2013; Salmela & Scheve 2017; yet critically, Müller 2016). 
Ressentiment is a complex antagonistic emotional disposition or sentiment. 
Since Nietzsche’s introduction of the technical term (1887) and Scheler’s first 
systematic elaboration (1912/1919), Ressentiment is usually characterized by an 
impotence or powerlessness to take reactive or retaliatory action against the 
perpetrators of alleged harms. It stems from a repression of other negative attitudes, 
such as distrust, anxiety, envy, malice or hatred, which lie at its source. This results 
in Ressentiment’s protracted and diachronically robust character. Accordingly, 
characteristic of Ressentiment is an indefinitely prolonged lag between felt injury 
and redress-oriented reactive expression or behaviour (Meltzer & Musolf 2002). 
Ressentiment must be clearly distinguished from resentment. Resentment is 
an often justified angry reaction towards political or moral injustices and often has a 
legitimate moral function as a normative marker for social or moral transgressions. 
 In testifying and reclaiming shared moral standards, loss of self-esteem or equality, 
it expresses a sense of justice.. Resentment may thus have the power for social or 
political change (Strawson 1962; Rawls 1971; Solomon 1995; Brudholm 2006; Fassin 
2013; Ure 2015; Mihai 2016; cf., critically, MacLachlan 2010). In contrast, 
Ressentiment though also presupposes the sense of a loss of equal footing, it is an 
overall destructive attitude. It is not geared at correcting or alleviating wrongdoings, 
but only at registering and voicing one’s felt injuries.  
But none of this seems sufficient to explain resentment’s role as an emotional 
gatekeeper for democratic order, equal respect, and critical political public, and 
Ressentiment’s deficiency regarding such role. Moreover, the nature and social-
psychological mechanisms underlying these emotions, as well as their relationship 
are still largely unresolved. For example, a crucial feature of Ressentiment, which 
has not yet been sufficiently recognized in the literature, but helps explaining its 
characteristic lack of corrigibility and malleability, is its indeterminate or 
overgeneralized object and ‘blurred’ affective focus. Furthermore, it is unclear why 
exactly, Ressentiment is usually associated with right-wing, whereas resentment 
with left-wing populist rhetorics and politics. 
In the face of these research desiderata, the proposed symposium shall 
provide novel explanations of these two sentiments by drawing on intra- and 
interdisciplinary resources from sociology, the political sciences, moral psychology, 
classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of emotions. 
Specifically, the three presentations will address the collective affective 
intentional structure, the according socio-psychological habitualization mechanisms 
and the specific normative nature and appropriateness conditions of Ressentiment 
(Szanto); the roles of Ressentiment and resentment in partially dissimilar emotional 
mechanisms behind support for right- and left-wing populist parties and movements 
(Salmela & von Scheve); the dialectical opposition of ressentiment, with its inherent 
tendency towards exclusion, nonrecognition and depreciation of other person’s or 
group’s beliefs and forms of living, and tolerance as a civic virtue enabling people to 
cope with social conflict and disagreement in an open-minded, calm and non-
aggressive manner (Rinofner-Kreidl). 
  
  
Friday Symposium  
Dynamics of Sociality in a World in Motion: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Affective Societies 
Organized by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler  
FU Berlin (Germany) 
Affect and emotion are crucial to human existence and sociality. As much as they 
integrate people into social and cultural environments and create communal bonds, 
they may also cause intense frictions that manifest demarcation, conflict and 
exclusion. 21st century societies are characterized by multiple mobilities; not only do 
people travel ever more quickly but so do ideas, objects, practices and information. 
Cultural and national boundaries are being crossed and blurred, thus transforming 
and reconfiguring established orders of meaning and feeling. 
The contributions to this panel address the dynamics of sociality in a world of 
motion from the perspectives of philosophy, social anthropology, sociology and 
legal studies. They focus on the affective dimensions of parent-child relations in 
transnational family constellations (Röttger-Rössler, social anthropology), on the 
construction of collective emotions in current debates on the recognition of religious 
minorities (Christian von Scheve, sociology), on the interplay of affect and power in 
contemporary political and governmental formations (Rainer Mühlhoff, philosophy) 
and on the affective-emotional dynamics in proceedings before the International 
Criminal Court in The Hague (Jonas Bens, legal anthropology). 
All contributors belong to the CRC “Affective Societies”, Freie Universität 
Berlin, which aims at establishing a new understanding of societies as affective 
societies, in which the fundamental meaning of emotionality and affectivity for 
communal life is taken into account, along with the manifold challenges of the 
mobile, interconnected and mediatized environments of the 21st century. 
 
The affective dimensions of parent-child relations in transnational families 
(Birgitt Röttger-Rössler – FU Berlin, Germany) 
The contribution addresses the formation of parent-child relationships within the 
context of migration from the perspective of emotion theory. What does it mean to 
raise children in transnational social fields and how do children experience their 
uprising in such settings? What does it mean to be the child of immigrants; that is, to 
 be brought up by parents who are influenced by practices, objects, values and people 
in a distant “homeland”, which often differ considerably from ways people act and 
think in the country of immigration? 
Based on empirical data raised in an ethnographic study about children of 
former Vietnamese contract laborers working in the erstwhile German Democratic 
Republic, the paper describes the conflicts which impair the relations between 
parents and children and depicts their entanglement with socio-cultural aspects. The 
main aim of the paper is to reflect the affective dynamics associated with this 
particular migration regime in order to gain a better understanding of the 
reconfigurations of family relations and attachment formations in the context of 
migration. 
 
Emotion and the discursive construction of social collectives:  
The case of religious minorities and the secular public sphere 
(Christian von Scheve – FU Berlin, Germany) 
Debates about the status and recognition of religious minorities in contemporary 
Western societies frequently evoke notions of „religious emotions“, for instance 
insult, harm, offence, and indignation. Focusing on public discourse in Germany, 
these debates are commonly centered on (immigrant) Muslims and their religious 
practices as well as on the status and reach of secular institutions, in particular the 
freedom of expression. In this contribution, I offer an understanding of these debates 
that capitalizes on concepts of affect and emotion and the discursive formation of 
social collectives. Based on empirical case studies, I show, first, that the linguistic 
coupling of emotions with specific social categories contributes to the emergence of 
collective and group-based emotions as well as to the formation of actual social 
collectives. Emotions as discursive categories are predominantly (self-)attributed to 
religious subjects as being (unduly) affected. In contrast, the secular subject is 
portrayed as rational, deliberate, and affectively neutral. These ascriptions not only 
become hallmarks of subjectivation, but also constitute secular and religious 
collectivities along the antagonisms of native–immigrant and rational–emotional. 
Second, and on a more speculative account, I argue that the language of this 
discourse itself bears a range of affective qualities that contribute to this 
collectivization beyond the attribution of specific emotions. In particular, the 
relational and material aspects of language render the religious and the secular, the 
rational and the emotional, “us” and “them” in antagonizing affective registers in 
this discourse. 
 Affect, Power, and Politics. A Spinozan Approach 
(Rainer Mühlhoff – FU Berlin, Germany) 
In the “turn to affect” of the 1990s and 2000s, “affect” was heralded as a way out of 
the impasse of post-structuralist theories of the subject. “Affect” was seen as an 
aggregate of de-subjectivation and social change. One decade later, in times of post-
truth politics and populist uprisings, hardly anyone shares this optimistic attitude 
towards affect anymore. 
In this talk, I will start from a dynamic interpretation of Spinoza’s ontology of 
affect to point out that the relation of affect and power is ambivalent. By introducing 
the concept of ‘affective resonance’, I will show how relational patterns of affecting 
and being affected dynamically stabilize micro-social structures. Affect can be 
understood as a register of social power that operates through the reciprocal 
modulation of individuals (as opposed to repression) in the synchronicity of 
situations. By introducing the concept of an ‘affective disposition’, which is related to 
the concept of a ‘dispositif’, I will argue that the specific affective capacity of an 
individual (potentia) is product of his/her biographical past. As the totality of 
affective traces of past relations, events and encounters, this disposition acts in the 
presence as potentials to affect and be affected and thus to perpetuate affective 
patterns and structures. 
Putting this together, it turns out that affect is, in fact, a register of relational 
and productive power with striking parallels to a concept of power after Foucault 
and Butler. Affective resonance dynamics can lead to a stabilization and 
perpetuation of dominant forms of social relationality (such as gender roles) that are 
deeply rooted in affective dispositions of individuals. Theories of affective 
ontogenesis can thus be linked with theories of subjectivation. This also offers an 
affect-theoretical approach to new forms of ‘political culture’. In particular I will 
outline how studies of populism can be informed by conceptual tools such as 
affective resonance and affective dispositions. 
 
On the Courtroom Atmosphere: Legal Objectivity as an Affective Register 
(Jonas Bens – FU Berlin, Germany) 
There is a common assumption that court proceedings are designed to cast aside 
affect and emotion in order to ensure a rational procedure with a just outcome. This 
paper takes the opposite approach and describes the courtroom as an apparatus to 
produce specific affective and emotional dynamics, a courtroom atmosphere. By 
presenting material based on several months of courtroom ethnography in the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague, the argument is made that courtroom 
proceedings are about mobilizing affect and emotion in order to produce objectivity. 
 Deploying the lens of affect theory, the courtroom is conceptualized as an 
affective arrangement in which human and non-human bodies interrelate. 
Describing the courtroom as an affective arrangement implies that affective and 
emotional dynamics are always present there, and some atmosphere is always 
enfolding. Instead of casting aside affect and emotion, the courtroom is set up to 
produce specific courtroom atmosphere. What differentiates the courtroom 
atmosphere from others is that it is characterized by objectivity. The theoretical claim 
that underlies this paper is that legal objectivity is in itself an affective register 
among others, not a mode of meaning-making that was somehow free of affect and 
emotion. Based on history of science research on objectivity, this paper highlights the 
connection between the idea of objectivity and the idea of the object. Objectivity as 
an affective register enfolds as a dynamic between those kinds of bodies which can 
be characterized as objects. To produce objectivity, bodies in the courtroom have to 
be objectified, which—as its flipside—entails the attempt of stripping their 
subjectivity. 
Attempts to suppress certain emotional displays (clapping, cheering, booing, 
outbursts of anger etc.) are then not merely a strategy to dissolve all affective 
dynamics, but only one strategy among many to strip bodies of their subjectivity. 
The introduction of non-human objects as evidence (images, video-tapes, forensic 
evidence etc.), quoting out of files and investigation reports rather than introducing 
human witnesses giving testimony in their own voice — acts that are not directly 
related to enforcing ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild) — are other visible strategies to 
produce an affective dynamic of objectivity. 
Actors in the courtroom therefore either aim to maintain or to disrupt the 
atmosphere of objectivity in certain respects. While judges might see themselves in 
the role of maintaining the courtroom atmosphere all the time, the parties might be 
striving to disrupt the atmosphere to the disadvantage of the adversary. All 
participants, however, must rely at some point on evoking objectivity to have their 
version of reality believed over another. In this perspective the process of truth 
finding before court is deeply embedded in the participants’ attempt to produce 
specific affective and emotional dynamics rather than casting aside affect and 
emotion altogether.  
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 Are Immoral Jokes Amusing?  
An Empirical Test of the Wrong Kinds of Reasons Problem 
Dong An 
 Texas A&M University (USA) 
According to the Fitting Attitude (FA) theory, something has certain evaluative 
property if and only if it is fitting to feel a certain way. The most prominent notion of 
“fitting” is there being a reason to have that response. One outstanding problem for 
FA theories is the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem: one can have different 
kinds of reasons for a certain feeling, but not all are relevant for the fittingness of the 
attitude. Suppose one judges a morally offensive joke unfunny based on moral 
considerations. According to FA theories, since there is a reason not to feel amused, 
the joke is not funny. However, some people argue that a morally offensive joke can 
still be funny and that moral reasons are irrelevant for determining the fittingness of 
amusement. They argue that unless FA theorists spell out how to distinguish the 
relevant from the irrelevant reasons, FA analysis fails. 
We argue that the WKR problem is not as strong as some scholars think. Two 
models have been distinguished. In the competing model, one can have different 
kinds of reasons for the response. For example, one can have a “fitting” reason to 
feel amused and a moral reason not to. If the moral reason outweighs the fitting 
reason, one will decide the joke unfunny. This model indeed faces the WKR 
problem. In the silencing model, moral features do not act as reasons that compete 
with other kinds of reasons but act as conditions that silence candidate reasons one 
might have otherwise for feeling amused. Our hypothesis is that moral features are 
sometimes inhibiting the funniness of a joke as the silencing model suggests.  
To test this hypothesis, we asked 43 college students to participate in an 
experiment where they read some neutral and offensive jokes. They were first asked 
to rate how funny and how offensive these jokes are. They rated again after we 
asked them to put away any social pressure. The first result is that among the 
samples who rated the jokes offensive, a substantial sample rated the jokes not 
funny. This indicates that moral features influence the evaluation of funniness. The 
second result is that among the samples who rated the jokes offensive, a substantial 
amount rated the jokes not funny and their ratings remain unchanged after they put 
aside pressure. This indicates that they saw the moral features but that they rated the 
jokes unfunny not because they do not want to look bad or want to show moral 
disapproval. If they were motivated in such a way, their rating after putting aside 
pressure should have increased. 
However, only a very small fraction of the sample did that. The best expla-
nation of this result is that most people used the silencing model. The existence of 
these cases implies that the proponents of the WKR problem owe us an explanation 
why these people commit the fallacy of citing irrelevant reasons in their evaluation. 
Thus, our work urges people to reassess the force of the damaging WKR problem. 
 Is it possible to achieve perfect love with an imperfect person? 
Aaron Ben Ze’ev 
University of Haifa (Israel) 
I examine the dream of having a perfect person with whom to establish an enduring 
perfect romantic relationship, by distinguishing between two senses of “perfect”: 
flawless and most suitable. In discussing romantic love, while criticizing the use of 
the first sense, I consider the second one to be valuable. Alongside this distinction, I 
make two other distinctions concerning the beloved’s properties. One distinction 
refers to whether they are discovered or bestowed; the second concerns whether 
these properties are non-relational or relational.  
In light of these distinctions, we can differentiate between the comparative 
and uniqueness approaches to the nature of the beloved. In the comparative 
approach, the perfect beloved is flawless, her most relevant properties are 
discovered, and her major cherished properties are non-relational. In the uniqueness 
approach, the perfect beloved is the most suitable partner, and her most significant 
romantic properties are mainly relational and bestowed.  
Both approaches are common and valuable in choosing a romantic partner. 
The decision of whether to give preference to one of these approaches is usually not 
straightforward; typically, it involves many considerations, each of which carries 
different weight. Such a decision takes place on a continuum between the two senses 
of perfect: flawless and most suitable. Most cases fall between the two extremes; the 
precise location on the continuum is determined by personal and contextual factors. 
Being aware of these differences is crucial for building a perfect (in the sense of most 
suitable) relationship with a nonperfect partner (in the sense of someone who is not 
flawless). 
 
Scaffolding of Moral Emotions  
in In-Group and Out-Group Disagreements 
Lasse T. Bergmann 
Osnabrück University (Germany) 
Moral sentimentalists and rationalists have been debating for a long time whether 
emotions pick up on morally relevant information. A recent contribution to the 
debate (Greene 2014) applies the distinction of in-group and out-group situations to 
moral problems. In-group problems are emanating from the social disagreements 
within a group, and out-group problems are disagreements of different groups or 
members of different groups. Differences in cognitive, emotional and neurobio-
logical functions have been studied in these situations, thus the disagreement 
 between sentimentalists and rationalists could be settled depending on which 
situation an agent is in. 
Greene uses this distinction for his rationalistic agenda, asserting emotions to 
be heuristics that are unable to accurately deal with unfamiliar out-group 
situations—but this view has many problems. A view which presents a much more 
plausible explanation for the differing usefulness of moral emotions in in-group 
versus out-group disagreements, is implied by the position of Colombetti and 
Krueger (2014). They argue that emotions are socially scaffolded phenomena, i.e. 
they rely on resources in the world to become available by integrating them into a 
cognitive environment. Through this attunement to resources in the world affective 
processes are amplified. 
A case in point is someone unintentionally breaking a norm, e.g. sitting on a 
chair in an exhibition, which unbeknownst to them is a piece of art. In most cases the 
person will not need an explicit verbal cue to realize that they have broken a norm. 
The immediate reactions of the surrounding people will make this abundantly 
clear—making sitting on the artwork very uncomfortable. The person implicitly 
picks up on relevant information through their affective experience as the people 
around her are part of her affective environment. The unavailability of these kinds of 
socially mediate scaffolds in out-group disagreements accounts for the shortcomings 
of emotions therein. The emotions and reactions of the out-group are not something 
to be open or sensitive to. They are considered untrustworthy, maybe dangerous or 
dehumanized—thus the information they provide is not integrated into decision 
making. 
However, humans engineer their own affective environment, thus it stands 
to reason that they can change whether their engagement with the world resembles 
an out-group engagement. Sentimentalist can argue that humans should engage 
with the world such that scaffolds are available and thus emotions pick up on 
morally relevant information. 
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 Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception:  
Suggested Hallucination and Perceptual Affect 
David Bitter 
CEU Budapest (Hungary) 
Is the way we perceive the world influenced by what we believe or desire the world 
to be? The converse is surely true: we often come to believe and desire what we do 
on the basis of what we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell. Might perception be 
informed by cognition in a similarly specific and direct manner? If the answer is yes, 
then perception is cognitively penetrable. Purportedly, this would have interesting 
consequences for theories of mental architecture, the justificatory role of perception, 
and the theory-ladenness of scientific observation.  
A trending view in philosophy and psychology to the contrary 
notwithstanding, this talk argues that there is in fact little reason to assume that 
perceptual experience of low-level features such as color or lightness is cognitively 
penetrable. Yet it is granted that not all candidates of cognitive penetration can be 
sufficiently explained away by intra-perceptual (e.g., shape-color associations) or 
cognitive factors (e.g., misplaced perceptual judgments). Rather, some phenomena 
are arguably more plausibly explained by alterations in perceptual affect.  
A most powerful example comes from the phenomenon of hypnotically 
suggested hallucination. In hypnosis, typically, one person (the subject) is guided by 
another (the hypnotist) to respond to suggestions for changes in subjective 
experience involving alterations in perception, thought, emotion, or behavior. 
Despite much prior skepticism, the effect is not a sham. Yet it doesn’t follow that 
subjects experience genuine perceptual hallucination or even cognitive delusion. 
More plausibly, just as suggested analgesia may involve a dissociation between the 
sensory and affective components of pain, it only feels to subjects as if the suggested 
state of affairs really pertained.  
If an affective analysis of suggested hallucination is correct, then the 
likelihood of finding convincing examples of cognitive penetration of perception 
cannot be very far from zero. But irrespective of epistemic likelihoods and the 
empirical fact of the matter, the proposed account also has important implications 
for the general structure of the cognitive-penetrability debate.  
For example, it is widely taken for granted that cognitive penetration may 
involve a penetration either of perception or perceptual belief. Many defenses of 
cognitive penetrability of perception accordingly negatively argue against explaining 
away candidate phenomena by appeal to distorted perceptual belief. A crucial 
implication of the present account is that such argumentation does not establish 
cognitive penetrability of perception.  
Another apparent common assumption is that if some experience in addition 
to or as opposed to low-level perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, then 
 either  high-level perceptual phenomenology or cognitive phenomenology or both 
exist.  he present proposal underscores that even if both the antecedent and the 
consequent of this conditional are true, the conditional as such is still false. For at 
least in some relevant cases, it is plausibly affective rather than perceptual or 
cognitive phenomenology that is relevantly penetrated.  
 
Grief and the Breakup of Romantic Relationships  
Luke Brunning 
University of Oxford (UK) 
My talk explores the distinct character of grief following the unilateral breakup of a 
romantic relationship. Grief is a process, involving many emotions, which is linked 
closely to, but not constituted by, narration. Bereavements and breakups have 
shared features. Some of these include: the telic collapse of shared goals and 
practices; the loss of intimate emotional support; the destruction of a co-authored 
idiolect; and jarring confrontations with the limits of personal agency.  
Breakups have a unique character, however, and strike distinctly at the heart 
of one’s identity. In understanding this, we can understand the character of grief 
more generally. When a relationship ends, one’s agency is implicated. One must 
navigate implicit or explicit blame, implied criticism of one’s relationship or 
character, and grapple to maintain self-esteem. This process is complicated by the 
prospect, however remote, of confronting the continued life of one’s ex-partner. 
Breakups generate complex narrative turbulence. Grief often makes one unable to 
narrate. The cessation of shared projects, and the upheaval of life, shapes one’s 
moods and existential feelings, which can impede one’s narrative capacities. Despite 
this, one’s narrative voice typically returns as one grapples with the event of death.  
In breakups, with a living ex-partner, and one grapples with a process, which 
is uncertain, ambivalent, or openly conflicted, due to the structure of contemporary 
romantic culture. Modern romantic life is internally ambivalent, and engages the 
whole self. Perceived failings in romantic life can destabilize the whole self: one’s 
personality is at fault. In addition, breakups animate many stakeholders. Family, 
friends, new partners, and ex-partners have their own narratives, and can contest 
one’s own narration. Finally, these narrative arcs are often the schematic ‘found-
objects’ of romantic culture. The partner as not-good-enough monster, for example, 
or the relationship as doomed. Stakeholders in a breakup jostle to reinforce or resist 
these narratives.  
As such, recovery of narrative grip in a breakup is often fragile, which 
contributes to the pain of a breakup. This fragility can tempt one towards narrative 
acquiesce: the desire to grasp an explanatory or justificatory readymade. To do so, 
however, is to succumb to a particular kind of Bovarysme, in which one’s relation to 
 a valued person and relationship, and one’s social context, is seen through the lens of 
a distorting narrative. The unique narrative turbulence after a breakup is not only 
painful, therefore, but generates ethical risks because narrative order is all too often 
restored at the cost of insensitivity. 
 
Aristotle on emotions: evaluative features and perceptual relevance. 
Pia Campeggiani 
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala (Sweden) 
In the De Anima Aristotle defines emotions as ‘enmattered accounts’, making it clear 
that emotions are not purely intellectual responses, but are embodied and based on 
physical processes as well (DA 403a16-25). They are always accompanied by 
pleasure or pain or both (e.g. EN 1105b 21-23, EE 1120b12-14, Rhet. 1378a21-22) and 
these hedonic states consist in bodily alterations (EE 1220b14, Rhet. 1382a21, 
1383b14, 1386b18-19, 23-24). Emotions thus amount to affective phenomena 
involving some kind of appraisal, but this is a form of appraisal that is neither 
abstractable nor separable in existence from bodily states (DA 403a19-24). Therefore, 
a proper definition of emotion must involve reference to both its formal and material 
components.  
Accordingly, in this paper, I will explore Aristotle’s view on emotions by 
anchoring it in the broader framework of his hylomorphic theory of the soul. 
Specifically, I will argue that, according to Aristotle: (i) our physical states can shape 
the way we select, perceive, and evaluate external stimuli: therefore, the beliefs and 
appraisals that feature in our emotional reactions also depend on the body. Bodily 
feelings guide our value orientation by lowering or raising our thresholds for 
emotional reactions, so that we accentuate or downplay the salience of eliciting 
conditions on the basis of our own internal states. (ii) Emotions, once aroused, 
involve the body in the same way, so that they influence perceptions and evaluations 
of all sorts, lead us to emphasize certain features of the percepts we select, and may 
even affect the hypotheses which precede the perceptual recognition of external 
stimuli themselves. By keeping a dual focus on the evaluative features of emotions 
and their perceptual relevance, I will claim that Aristotle’s psychology provides us 
with an account of affectivity that characterizes it as an essential dimension of 
cognition. 
 Emotions "out there". Affects and the Extended Mind Hypothesis 
Marta Caravà  
University of Bologna (Italy) 
Marta Benenti 
FINO Consortium (Italy) 
The “Extended Mind Hypothesis” (EMH) challenges the idea that cognitive 
phenomena are bounded to humans’ skulls and brains (Clark, Chalmers 1998; Clark 
2008). To argue against this internalist account of the mind, it appeals to externalism 
of vehicles (Hurley 2010). This one holds that in some cases contents of dispositional 
mental states are enabled by environmental props and artefacts: objects such as 
notebooks and laptops embody information that draws the agent who performs a 
cognitive task to act in a certain way. Given this crucial functional role of objects in 
cognitive processes, the EMH claims that the mind can be partially constituted by 
objects of the environment.  
Although we are sympathetic with the EMH we claim that it entails two 
problems. First, it does not explain those experiences that do not involve content, 
because it is committed to the view that mind extends into the world only as long as 
objects are content-carriers (Hutto, Myin 2013).  
Second, it fails to account for the very agency of objects because it takes them 
to be cognitively relevant only because they store information. We suggest that, in 
order to actually extend the mind, the theory should focus on what objects actually 
do in cognitive processes.  
We claim that affective experience is crucial to discuss these two points. 
Indeed, i) some affective experiences (e.g. moods) do not entail intentional contents 
and ii) objects are often ascribed affective characters in virtue of their material, 
perceptual and phenomenological properties, rather than in virtue of their capacity 
to store information. Therefore, assessing the emotional features of objects can help 
to understand objects’ agency better. This would provide a deeper and more 
successful account of extended cognitive experiences than the EMH’s one.  
To develop our proposal, we look at the ongoing debate about expressiveness 
artworks and natural objects. In particular, we endorse those views that consider the 
experience of expressive qualities of things as being perceptual in character (e.g. 
Wollheim 1993; Davies 1994; 2005; Noordhof 2008). After drawing the distinction 
between the capacity of objects to move us and the possibility that we ascribe them 
expressive characters, we insist that such attributions are first of all made possible by 
the material constitution of objects.  
Thus, acknowledged that several variables (e.g. beliefs, felt emotions, 
contextual features, projections and affective reactions) can influence our perception, 
we focus on the perceptual recognition of objects which is affectively permeated at a 
 level that does not require any particular background knowledge nor cognitive 
abilities.  
The sad, threatening, agitated, lively look of objects can channel our actions 
and reactions in a mostly unreflective fashion. Therefore, an extended approach 
should consider them not only as “intellectual anchors” but also as “emotional 
anchors” (Malafouris 2013; Gosden 2005).  
We believe that our proposal might i) extend the EMH to emotional features 
(in the vein of Colombetti, Roberts 2014), explaining how the material structure of 
objects shapes their “emotional agency”; ii) help think of extended experiences 
without contents. 
 
Affect Mirrors 
Damian Cox 
Bond University, Queensland (Australia) 
In this paper I explore the concept of an affect mirror. By “affect mirror”, I mean the 
process by which one comes to understand one’s own affective states by observing 
oneself in the eyes of another, by seeing one’s own affective states mirrored in an 
encounter with another. I use two films to explore affect mirrors: Call me by your 
name (Guadagnino, 2017) and La Promesse (Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne, 1996). 
People sometimes fail to accurately track their own affective states; they sometimes 
fail to notice the precise nature of their feelings or they hide the nature of their 
feelings from themselves under a cover-story of one sort or another. In such cases we 
can occasionally rely on others to make up the deficit. An obvious way of coming to 
understand affective states that are obscure to us is to infer them from the way 
others react to our actions. Fear in the eyes of another may demonstrate an otherwise 
unnoticed hostility or aggression; pity or overt concern may demonstrate an 
emotional fragility one is disguising from oneself. This is, in many ways, an 
unremarkable phenomenon. My interest lies in another path to affective self-
knowledge. Is it possible to learn how one feels by seeing one’s feelings mirrored by 
another? I think it is both possible and common. 
My task is to give an account of this phenomenon – the phenomenon of the 
affect mirror. I wish to set out the conditions in which we are likely to encounter it 
and what makes it possible. I argue that it is a form of recognition, rather than 
inference. I argue that it is crucial in many relationships, especially intercultural 
relationships, where it enables mutual understanding across cultural difference. I 
develop the argument in terms of the two films. Call me by your name explores the 
relationship between a teenage boy and an adult man. La Promesse explores a 
burgeoning ethical encounter between a teenage boy and a woman from Burkina 
Faso. The two films portray contrasting forms of affect mirrors and put them to 
 aesthetic work in different ways. In Call me by your name affect mirrors accomplish 
the erotic work of the film; in La Promesse they accomplish the ethical work of the 
film. In intercultural encounters, such as portrayed in La Promesse, much cognitive 
work is done by exploring difference. The boy is attentive to the myriad differences 
that mark out the woman from Burkina Faso from himself. But this, I argue, is not 
sufficient to explain the boy’s ethical transformation in the film. For this we need to 
understand the work done by affect mirrors. The lovers in Call me by your name 
play an erotic game, one which informs the film’s title. The erotic force of this game 
is explained by affect mirrors. 
The Peculiarity of Angst. Delimitation of the Fundamental Attunement. 
Luca Dondoni  
University of Pavia (Italy) 
Our research arises within the framework of Heidegger's Dasein-analytik, with the 
aim of determining and delimitating the controversial concept of Angst. We will 
endeavour to detect and investigate the relevant features that set Angst apart from 
the other affects – Fear and Boredom, above all – in the theoretical project unveiled 
by Being and Time. This comparative work will enable us to grasp the crucial role  
played by Angst in the dynamic of disclosure of the fundamental constitution of 
Dasein as Temporality.  
The opening section of our paper will serve as historical and theoretical 
introduction to the main guidelines of Heidegger's enquiry on the ontological 
constitution of the Dasein and on its substantial nexus to affects – this concise 
foreword will be useful to highlight the actual relevance granted by Heidegger to the 
affects for his metaphysical project.  
The second section is devoted to the comparison between Angst and Furcht – 
Fear. We will address the relationship between these two affects, whose contours are 
prone to fade ones into the others. While the presence of Furcht denotes an adverse 
prediction about a concrete and imminent danger, Angst is not direct to any 
determined, present or anticipated event: Angst seems to be not immediately 
motivated. The prima facie insight about the non-directness of Angst will lead our 
further analysis. From our comparison with Fear, Angst, as a particular way to be-
into-the-world, will emerge as the fundamental phenomenal way to experience the 
Nichts, and so to grasp the primordial Being-towards-Death of the Dasein.  
In the third part of our research we will tackle the analogy between Angst and 
Langeweile – Boredom. While the analyses conducted by Freud and by Heidegger 
somehow managed to delimit the concept of Angst from the one of Fear, the 
relationship between Angst and Boredom remains problematic. There cannot be 
found a consistent and exhaustive discussion about the role of Boredom in the 
context of Being and Time, and we believe that this may be due to a deliberate 
 theoretical decision – that we will properly discuss. Boredom will return on stage 
with two subsequent works, both dated 1929, namely one prolusion – What is 
Metaphysics? – and one lecture course – The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 
World, Finitude, Solitude. We will notice how the account of Boredom drawn by 
Heidegger in these pieces closely traces back the one of Angst that he had put forth 
in Being and Time. Only via the analytic comparison between Angst and Boredom 
we will be allowed to draw some further consideration about the close relationship 
that binds together Angst and Time, Dasein and the World, affects and the 
primordial constitution of Being-towards-Death.  
The last section will serve as summary in which we will recall the premises of 
our work and the purposes it moved from, and compare them to the achievements 
we have gained through our research. We will also draw some considerations about 
the initial detected confusion about the nature of Angst and its phenomenology, 
highlighting how this issue is still far from being settled. 
 
The Irrationality of Anticipitory Guilt 
Alison Duncan Kerr  
University of St. Andrews (UK) 
When is it rational to feel guilt in anticipation of doing some action? Consider a 
person faced with a choice situation between two different options, A and B. The 
person very much wants choice A, but realizes that she will feel great guilt over 
doing A—as she contemplates this choice situation, she feels this anticipatory guilt. 
Empirical evidence suggests that implicit bias is frequent with anticipatory 
emotions. When one anticipates how one will feel about a future event, one tends to 
imagine that one will feel far more happy than one ends up feeling, or one imagines 
that one will feel far more sadness than one ends up feeling. What explains these 
phenomena? One thought is that emotion regulation plays a role in the result that 
one does not end up feeling as strongly as one might have anticipated. In other 
words, when one anticipates feeling sad about a choice one has made, the result is 
that one doesn’t feel as sad merely because one regulates one’s sadness in 
anticipation of the event. If a person is faced with the choice situation, and 
anticipates feeling great guilt over doing option A, perhaps she might not feel as 
much guilt as is appropriate in light of the situation. In these regards, anticipatory 
guilt sometimes does one a disservice. In developing this account, I motivate the 
distinction between the fittingness conditions for anticipatory guilt as they differ 
from the fittingness conditions for guilt. And, finally, the account is careful to 
distinguish between between anticipatory emotions and metaemotions. 
 Is emotion recognition scripted? Emotional expressions as social signals 
Gina Eickers 
Berlin School of Mind and Brain / FU Berlin (Germany) 
Emotion recognition was long presumed to happen automatically, fast, and reliably. 
However, there is an emerging line of resistance to this received view, according to 
which emotion recognition is highly sensitive to context, and thus requires active 
and adaptive forms of information processing. 
In this paper, I defend the context-dependent view of emotion recognition 
and postulate underlying psychological mechanisms. I point to different aspects of 
context that have an influence on emotions occurring in specific situations and on 
how these emotions can be recognized. Based on these arguments, I conclude that 
recognition often depends on the use of scripts. 
First, I take a closer look at classic emotion theories. Ekman, for example, 
claims that there is a biologically fixed set of basic emotions (Ekman, 1969, 1971, 
1999). Thus, emotional expressions, Ekman argues, are distinctive universal signals: 
there is not only an emotion-specific physiology but also emotion-specific 
expressions. Ekman’s claims seem to entail that people, independent of culture and 
context, have a universal capacity to recognize specific facial muscle movements as 
emotional expressions (Gendron & Feldman Barrett, 2017). 
Not only Ekman, but also accounts of folk psychology assume that emotions 
can be reliably recognized from facial expressions (cf. Goldman, 2006, Gallese, 
2001,2007). It seems that standard accounts of folk psychology agree with Ekman’s 
claims that emotion recognition happens automatically, reliably, and does not need 
more information than the expression provided in a face. 
But claiming that emotion recognition is independent of context is highly 
problematic. Studies on emotional expressions show that social context has a lasting 
effect on how emotional expressions are interpreted (Hess, 2009, Crozier & de Jong, 
2012, Gendron & Feldman Barrett, 2017) and thus assert the hypothesis that social 
context plays a crucial role for emotion recognition. Emotional transaction theory 
argues in a similar fashion, stating that emotions are designed to function in social 
contexts and arguing that there is a reciprocal relationship between context and 
emotion (Fridlund, 1994, Griffiths & Scarantino, 2005). 
Another proponent of a context-dependent account of emotions is Russell. He 
formulates his account in terms of scripts (Russell, 1991, 2003). Following Lakoff, he 
considers emotions to have different components and to be scripts in the sense of 
being a sequence of subevents (Russell, 2003, Lakoff, 1987). 
My proposal here is to extend Russell’s approach, and more generally the 
stance emotional transaction theory takes -- emotions being scripted and active 
actions rather than passive events -- to emotion recognition. That is, in this paper I 
argue that emotion recognition works via scripts as well. For example, if someone 
 displays anger (or any other emotional expression), responses will depend on the 
contextual structures given in that situation, e.g., gender, social status, occupation, 
situation. If knowing the meaning of an emotion term is to know a script for that 
emotion (Russell, 1991, 2003) and if emotional expression is a feature of an emotion 
script (Russell, 2003), then it is plausible to argue that emotion recognition works via 
scripts. 
On the Phenomenology of Artificial Emotions 
Lydia Farina  
 University of Exeter (UK) 
This paper examines the phenomenology of artificial emotions viewed as emotions 
of artificial systems such as robots. The dominant view in the literature on artificial 
intelligence is that artificial systems, although capable of recognising and simulating 
emotional behaviour, they are not capable of experiencing emotions; the 
phenomenology aspect of artificial emotions is non-existent (Picard 2003; Moss 
2016). Other philosophers claim that as we are currently unable to reductively 
explain phenomenal states, we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that 
artificial systems might be able to experience emotions (Stephan 2009). I approach 
this question by discussing Heidegger’s ‘attunement to the world’, an openness to 
the world viewed as a necessary requirement for experiencing emotions (Heidegger 
1927; Smith 2016). Welton describes this ‘openness’ as affectivity, an ability to care 
about what is given to us in experience (Welton 2012). This ‘openness to the world’ 
entails the possibility of emotional experience where the external object is 
experienced in a certain attitude. This phenomenological aspect, what Kriegel calls 
the ‘representational attitude or mode’ of a phenomenal state is irreducible to 
neurobiological states and it individuates emotional states from other mental states 
and from each other (Kriegel forthcoming). In this paper I argue that, for artificial 
systems to be able to experience emotions, they must be attuned to the world in the 
Heideggerian sense of ‘things mattering to them’ (Heidegger 1927) such that they are 
capable of affectivity; that they able to represent what is given to them in experience 
in a certain evaluative attitude. I argue that being attuned to the world just means 
‘being in a state which determines the significance of one’s surroundings’ regardless 
of how this state is physically realised. If artificial systems are capable of affectivity 
in this sense, one cannot reject a priori that they are not capable of experiencing 
emotionality.  
A common objection against the view that artificial systems are capable of 
experiencing emotional phenomenology is that they do not possess human-like 
biological bodies (Moss 2016); they cannot undergo the bodily transformation which, 
according to some accounts, constitutes or causes the emotional experience (James 
1884). I argue that views which reject the claim that artificial systems can be attuned 
 to the world in the Heideggerian sense, because they lack human-like organic 
bodies, are based on the mistaken beliefs that affectivity and emotionality are 
necessarily bound to an organic human body or that phenomenal states are 
reducible to neurobiological states. If my argument is successful and artificial 
systems are capable of affectivity, our focus should move from the metaphysical 
question of whether a phenomenology of artificial emotions can exist to the 
epistemological question of whether we would be in a position to know what that 
specific phenomenology would be like, as well as the normative question of whether 
we have to ensure that, as artificial systems are increasingly situated in social spaces, 
they must develop and experience emotions. 
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Devilish tongues of angels? On the Ethics of Manipulation 
Alexander Fischer 
Basel University (Switzerland) 
When we think of Manipulation, we often think of evil manipulators like 
Shakespeare’s Iago. He manipulates Othello, who is unaware of this, powerless, 
loses himself and becomes furiously jealous, killing Desdemona during the process. 
But while Manipulation can surely be used for devilish ends, in a deceptive manner 
and maybe even with a certain intensity that makes it impossible for agents to act 
otherwise, it doesn’t have to be like this. In fact, there are no good reasons to define 
Manipulation in this negative normative manner. So, in this talk I (1) want to put 
forward, that the moral status of Manipulation is much more complex than the Iago-
 Othello-example suggests; just think of how a young love is not based on rationally 
convincing the other person of us being worthy as a partner, but how we speak with 
tongues of angels, enter a kind of game, dancing around each other – manipulating 
back and forth. This obviously is not the same as what Iago does. Now, if we (2) try 
to look at Manipulation in a neutral way, we can define it as follows: Manipulation is 
the power to make it more likely, that a manipulated agent chooses some end 
(action, belief, etc.) by actively changing the emotional attraction of certain ends or 
their realization – but the agent remains ultimately free to choose or not to choose 
this end. The transformation of emotional bonds just makes some options more 
appealing (or unappealing) to the manipulated and thus more likely to be chosen (or 
not). Starting with this definition, which fits the Shakespeare-example as well as the 
young love-example, we can (3) get a clearer look on the normative issues that 
Manipulation imposes on us. Mainly it is the concerted use of our affective levels 
that raises suspicion (especially in classical ethical theories) as we cherish our 
rational agency, which presupposes our autonomy – thus Manipulation, e.g. 
speaking with the tongues of angels, seems to be devilish. But then again, this 
evaluation might at times also be counterintuitive. It is the weight that moral 
philosophers give to autonomy when evaluating Manipulation, that I want to 
challenge in this talk. I will offer an alternative account of an Ethics of Manipulation, 
which is able to include our affinity of autonomy, but places emphasis on the 
affection of our character development, psychic ecology, the possibility of acting 
freely and the use of positive ends. Thus, a more flexible ethical perspective on the 
manifold ways of how Manipulation occurs in our everyday life opens up, making it 
possible to respect a grave premise, that we always have to keep in mind when 
thinking about how humans act and how we need to think about how humans ought 
to act: that we are all rational, but nonetheless bounded rational agents. 
 
Embarrassment: A Foundation for an Ethics of Vulnerability 
Michael Hearn 
The University of Queensland (Australia) 
The intuition underpinning this paper is that embarrassment possesses the potential 
to influence a consideration of an ethics of vulnerability. Embarrassment, in concert 
with the blush, I will argue, provides something like the normative and prescriptive 
force necessary if such an ethics is to be considered seriously. Accordingly, I hope to 
give an account of ethics that will itself account not just for the human animal but all 
animals, mindful of Jacques Derrida’s ‘accusation’ against Emmanuel Levinas that 
his ethics failed in this regard. 
I will proceed on the understanding that embarrassment evolved as a way of 
preventing social exclusion, allowing those who displayed “inclusive fitness” to 
 adapt more successfully to group living.1 In order to avoid “social ostracism”, surely 
the ‘death’ of the human subject constructed within alterity, “embarrassment likely 
developed (1) as an appeasement gesture, (2) to deter social transgression, and (3) to 
motivate amends and reparations for the social wrong.”2 Alongside this criteria, 
when we consider that the subject blushing from embarrassment is signalling 
“submission and apology”, while at the same time scanning “their emotional 
surroundings […] as they attempt to repair their social transgressions”, we get a 
compelling picture of an ethical animal, if such be defined as that which occurs prior 
to being named human.3 
Behaviour associated with displays of embarrassment is described in the 
scientific literature as “prosociality […] defined as caring about others’ welfare and 
avoiding behaviours that may damage another’s welfare.”4 The blush also elicits 
from the other “emotions and behaviours” that serve to “remedy social 
transgressions.”5 In short, the subject blushing  from embarrassment is more likely to 
be forgiven than a subject who displays no such appeasement signal.6 The 
evolutionary origins of the blush correspond with those of embarrassment, leading us 
to think it “reasonable to conclude that, along with the singular physiological 
response of blushing that might be its hallmark, embarrassment has desirable 
functions in social life.”7 
I hope to demonstrate how embarrassment and the blush lend themselves to a 
consideration of ethics. By relying on scientific research, combined with a reading of 
Levinas, I trust it will become evident, even to Derrida, that an ethics with the blush of 
embarrassment at its core can account for all. 
 
1 Ryan S. Darby & Christine R. Harris, “A biosocial perspective on embarrassment,” in The 
Psychological Significance of the Blush, eds., W. Ray Crozier & Peter J. de Jong 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 122. 
2 Ibid., 122. 
3 Ibid., 123. 
4 Matthew Feinberg, Robb Willer, and Dacher Keltner, “Flustered and Faithful:  
Embarrassment as a Signal of Prosociality,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 102 (2012), 81; authors’ emphasis. 
5 Dacher Keltner & Cameron Anderson, “Saving Face for Darwin: The Functions and Uses of 
Embarrassment,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 9 (2000), 187-190. 
6 Ibid., 190. 
7 Roland S. Miller, “The interactive origins and outcomes of embarrassment,” in The 
Psychological Significance of the Blush, eds., W. Ray Crozier & Peter J. de Jong 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 199. 
 Emotional Response as a Normative Guide 
Isabel Kaeslin  
Columbia University (USA) 
Recently, philosophers have started to pay more attention to the study of the 
emotions. On the one hand, they investigate their role in action explanation1 and in 
expression of meaning2, and on the other, the question has been raised what role the 
emotions play in moral decisions. I will be concerned with the latter question. I will 
argue that there is a non-cognitive kind of emotional response that is best 
understood as an expression of value, which needs to be taken seriously by the 
subject experiencing it when making moral decisions. I will be claiming that in this 
way, the emotions play a much more independent role in moral decisions than has 
been attributed to them before, even in the most emotion-sympathetic literature.3 
For that purpose I will first disambiguate between different notions of 
emotion, in order to specify the kind of emotional response that interests me, and of 
which I want to suggest that it has been underestimated in its role in normatively 
guiding our actions. Once we have this specific notion of emotional response at 
hand, I will then ask how such emotional responses can guide our actions in a way 
that cognitive or rational mental processes cannot. The main task will be to avoid the 
threat to conceive of the emotional response as 'habituated reason'4, that is, to 
conceive of the emotional response merely as a trained or conditioned way to 
respond exactly in the way rational deliberation would. For this is what I think has 
led previous authors to end up with a too rationalist conception of moral decisions, 
even when they attempted to give the emotions a robust role. 
 
What is an Emotional Response - Disambiguation 
Often when the question of the relationship between morality and emotions is 
posed, one immediately thinks of paradigmatic so-called 'moral emotions', such as 
anger, courage, perhaps love, jealousy, and so on. These are complex entities5 of 
which it is important to ask what roles they play in moral decisions. I will not be 
concerned with such sophisticated emotions, as I call them. I'm interested in a more 
primitive form of emotional response, namely, in what I call spontaneous dislike and 
spontaneous attraction. In other words, I focus on basic emotional expressions of 
value. How are they different from the so-called moral emotions? We can ask the 
same questions about them as have been asked about the sophisticated emotions: 
Are they mere feelings,6 are they intentional,7 that is, have an object, and ultimately, 
do they show us anything about how good or bad the relevant action or situation is? 
To illustrate, here is an example of a Spontaneous Dislike and a Spontaneous 
Attraction.  
 
 Emotional Response as Spontaneous Dislike or Attraction 
Imagine that you've always enjoyed eating meat, so much so that you indulge 
yourself in eating a substantial amount of meat every day. Suddenly, today, when 
you're about to bite into your steak again, it just doesn't feel right. You cannot tell 
what would be wrong about it (no cognitive dislike), but you feel a dislike about 
having another bite of your steak: you're experiencing a spontaneous dislike. It's an 
emotional response that doesn't have any cognitive aspect - it's non-rational or non-
intellectual - and it appears suddenly. This emotional response will give you (prima 
facie) cause to reflect on your usual pattern of acting, which until this moment was 
taken for granted. Hence, even such a primitive emotional response makes you 
question a previously unquestioned pattern of acting. The moral significance of this 
disruption of old patterns of acting will concern us in the second half of the paper. 
For now, note that the same reflective attitude can be caused by a spontaneous 
attraction: Let's imagine that you've been a confident vegetarian for the last ten years 
of your life. Today, just when you're about to bite into your vegetarian sandwich, 
you experience a sudden desire for some meat in it: you experience a spontaneous 
attraction. Again, you cannot tell what you like about the idea (no cognitive 
attraction), but you feel the attraction of doing so. Again, this emotional response 
will give you (prima facie) cause to reflect on your usual pattern of acting, which for 
many years was taken for granted. So, again, even such a primitive emotional 
response can disrupt longstanding patterns of acting. 
I will argue that emotional responses of this kind can disrupt patterns of 
action in a distinctive fashion, thereby playing a role in motivation that rational or 
cognitive mental processes do not. This is not to say that a new rational 
consideration could not give the agent pause, thereby prompting her to reflect anew 
on patterns of action. It is to say, however, that it would not achieve the same kind of 
disruption as an emotional response of this form does. 
I will argue that such emotional responses are not mere feelings, that we can 
think of them as intentional (as having an object) even though they are not cognitive, 
and that they can normatively guide us in our actions in a distinctive way, namely 
by giving us negative reasons against our usual patterns of acting. That is, they can 
only play a negative role in guiding our actions, by 'telling' us what not to do. These 
disruptive negative reasons against usual patterns of acting are the independent 
contribution of the emotional responses in normative guidance. 
 
1 Betzler, Monika (2007): “Making Sense of Actions Expressing Emotions.” In: Dialectica 
61(3): 447-466. Betzler, Monika (2009): “Expressive Actions.” In: Inquiry 52(3): 272-
292. 
2 Green, Mitchell (2016): "Expressing, Showing, and Representing" In: C. Abell and J. Smith 
(eds.) Emotional Expression. Philosophical, Psychological, and Legal Perspectives. 
 3 For example, Martha Nussbaum (in Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions 
(2001)) takes the emotions to be cognitive and belief-like, and for that reason they 
play a significant role in moral decisions according to her. As a contrast, I want to 
argue for an independent role of the emotions in moral decisions, one that does not 
rely on them being belief-like. 
4 Or, using Brady's language, the threat of thinking of emotional responses as "proxy 
reason". (Brady, Michael (2013): Emotional Insight. The Epistemic Role of Emotional 
Experience, p. 118) 
5 in Aaron Ben-Ze'ev's sense: The Subtlety of Emotions (2001). 
6 Damien Whiting (2011): "The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed 
Emotions." In: European Journal of Philosophy 19(2): 281-303. 
7 R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace 
 
 
Agnes Heller’s Theory of Feelings: Empathy 
Hye Young Kim  
Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris (France) 
In “Über die Verschiedenheit der Ästhetischen, Reflektierten und Ethischen 
Empathie” (Heller 2016), Agnes Heller analyzes the differences between three types 
of empathy: aesthetic, reflective, and ethical, and shows how empathy works in our 
life and what we can do with it. In this paper, I would like to articulate her analysis 
of empathy along with her theory of feelings based on A Theory of Feelings (Heller 
2009) and discuss what we can understand by empathy or ‘feeling with’ and which 
meaning, or significance we can find from this discourse in the present day where 
we observe the revival of the history of fascism 
 
 
Effects of voice prosody on interpersonal impression formation. 
Miho Kitamura 
Waseda University, Tokyo (Japan)  
People form the personal impression of a speaker based on the content that he is 
talking. On hearing a voice, people also form a personal impression of that speaker. 
Vocal prosody differs from types of emotion, and would modulate personal 
impressions. Present study examined how the emotional prosody modulates 
interpersonal impressions using a voice transformation tool (DAVID; Da Amazing 
Voice Inflection Device (Ancourier, et al., 2017)). We prepared 81 voice descriptions 
those are implying different personality traits (for example, positive personality: “He 
promised not to smoke in his apartment since his roommate was trying to quit”). 
 These sentences are pretested for valence and arousal (n=39). Based on these scores, 
we selected 54 descriptions, and those were divided into the three valence categories 
(positive, neutral, and negative). There are no significant differences of arousal 
scores between the three categories. We recorded these descriptions spoken in a 
neutral tone by a young female native Japanese speaker. Using the voice 
transformation tool (DAVID), those neutral voices are modulated toward happy or 
sad emotional voices by changing the prosody of them. Twenty-three participants 
listened to those emotional voices and answered what kind of impressions they have 
by a 7-point Likert-scale (from 1;negative to 7;positive). Results showed that there is 
a significant difference of the person impressions between the happy and sad voices, 
suggesting that the types of voice emotion modulated the person impressions. 
Interestingly, the effect of voice emotion is stronger for the positive and negative 
emotional descriptions than that for the neutral ones. That means that emotions of 
voices and descriptions would strongly interact with each other during the 
impression formation. 
 
 
I can’t beat it’: Dimensions of the bad conscience in  
Manchester by the Sea. 
Marguerite La Caze  
The University of Queensland (Australia) 
In this paper, I interpret Vladimir Jankélévitch’s work on the bad conscience (2015) 
and on forgiveness (2005) in relation to the film Manchester by the Sea (Kenneth 
Lonergan, 2016). This film is a striking meditation on remorse and the difficulty of 
self-forgiveness for Lee Chandler, a man who lives a monastic life as a janitor in 
Boston after the tragic death of his three children in a house fire. Many discussions of 
the film so far have primarily focused on its depictions of the emotions of despair 
and grief (with brief references to guilt), aspects of it that are certainly important. 
(Lane, 2016; Scott, 2016; Fleming, 2017) However, a focus on grief neglects the ethical 
dimensions of the film that Jankélévitch’s intense articulations of the solitary 
character of remorse and what a genuine offering of forgiveness really concerns can 
illuminate and engage with. His accounts demonstrate the immense complexity of 
remorse, self-forgiveness, and the difficult of accepting the generous forgiveness of 
others, even in situations where the calamity that has occurred is not a result of a 
deliberate, intentional action. In his elucidation, Jankélévitch identifies remorse and 
the bad conscience, which is not a response to an external law: ‘It is the crime itself 
that is our torture.’ (2015, 37) Manchester by the Sea allows us to understand what 
that experience might mean for a human life, and how sometimes we can neither 
 give up remorse and forgive ourselves nor accept the forgiveness of others. For 
Jankélévitch, forgiveness must be an event, a gift of love, and a personal relation to 
the other, rather than forgetting, excusing, or putting aside. While the film shows us 
the power of such forgiveness when it is offered by Lee’s former partner and mother 
of their three children, Randi, it also shows us its limits. The problem is that Lee’s 
apparent obsessive remorse dwells in the irreversibility of time and the irrevocability 
of our acts that Jankélévitch explains, and goes further in being a remorse that 
cannot be overcome. The film also enables us to question features of Jankélévitch’s 
view: that we can undo the consequences of our act or deed, in contrast to the action, 
and that self-forgiveness is a conceptual impossibility, because forgiveness must be a 
relation to another, rather than sometimes an existential one. I consider how 
Manchester by the Sea examines the bad conscience through the experience of one 
person’s incapacity to overcome or ‘beat’ his remorse despite the forgiveness of 
others. 
 
 
The Self and Other in Empathy 
Heidi Maibom  
University of Cincinnatti (USA) 
Empathy is often described as feeling an emotion that is more appropriate to another 
person’s situation than to our own. This suggests that the closer we get to replicating 
exactly what another person feels, the better our empathizing is. Our job is to 
transform ourselves, imaginatively, into the other and experience what she does in 
her situation. I shall argue that this is not the right way to think about empathy. 
Were we simply to take on another’s experience as another, it would be foreign to 
us. Our own emotions appear as deeply embedded in our lives to the extent that 
they bear an intricate relationship to our experiences, our current situation, and the 
persons that we are. The significance of, say, sadness may be rather unique to us. We 
should expect the same to be true of the target we are empathizing with. 
To the extent that experiencing an emotion is more of a holistic and extended 
event than a discreet and relatively contained one, we should not expect to be able to 
feel what another feels exactly. Even if it were possible we could not use this 
emotion because it would fail to be integrated into our mental economy. It would 
not have the significance to us as it does to the target. And so we must always 
experience a version of what another experiences that is personalized. Harriett 
Beecher Stowe claims that what really aroused her empathy for slaves was the death 
of her favorite child. She wrote “at his dying bed and grave I learned what a poor 
slave mother must feel when a child is torn away from her.” (Stowe 1852/2009) She 
learned this lesson not intellectually, but affectively by feeling that she shared in the 
 slave mother’s grief. At the same time there is no denying that her grief at her 
favorite child dying of cholera is quite dissimilar from the grief or pain of a 
particular slave at having her child sold. It would be a mistake, however, to see this 
as a problem with empathy. On the contrary, our own experiences, felt personally in 
our bodies and minds, are the elements out of which empathy for others blossom. 
I go on to explore in more detail how empathy really aims at replicating the 
significance of the emotional experience to the other more than the particular 
emotion the other happens to experience. To truly empathize, the emotion we 
experience as sharing with the other must make sense to us. This does not mean that 
we simply project what we feel in response to another’s situation on to them, 
however. The point of empathy is to feel something consonant with what another 
person feels, but in our own person, that makes some sense to us, yet is not a mere 
projection of our own emotions. 
 
 
Emotions and Imagination. A Sartrean Perspective 
Danilo Manca 
University of Pisa (Italy) 
In this talk, I would like to explore the controversial interaction between emotions 
and imagination. In the first part of the talk, I will sketch a phenomenological 
account of some emotions such as anger, hatred and fear, by referring to Aristotle’s 
analyses. The aim is to show the ambivalent role imagination plays in the arousal of 
an emotion. On one hand, imagination is able to arouse, to extend in time and to 
renew an emotion, on the other it is able to satisfy the pleasure arising out of an 
emotion as well as to neutralize its pain. 
In the second part of my talk, I will compare Sartre’s sketch for a theory of 
emotions with his account of the imaginary. I will discuss the idea that both 
emotions and imagination can be seen as a sort of break with the ordinary 
instrumental lifeworld because they throw consciousness in the horizon Sartre calls 
“the Magic”. Nonetheless, whereas emotions entail beliefs, imagination is the source 
of the neutralization of all mundane horizons characterizing the phenomenological 
approach. Accordingly, I will ask whether this implies that the activity of 
imagination is a necessary condition to educate our emotional life as well as to make 
it the object of a phenomenological investigation. 
 
  
 Interpretivism and emotional action 
Bruno Mölder 
University of Tartu (Estonia)  
The paper focuses on the (putative) trouble that emotions raise for the interpretivist 
position, the view that interpretation plays the constitutive role in the possession of 
the mind. 
In „Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial 
Intelligence“ Craig DeLancey (Oxford UP 2002) has claimed that interpretivism is 
not an adequate approach to the mind, because it fails to accommodate basic 
emotions. In particular, he argues that interpretivists cannot predict certain kinds of 
emotional actions, that is, actions, which are explained in the light of the occurrence 
of basic emotions. As interpretivism tends to make sense of actions in terms of 
beliefs and desires, this approach gets into trouble when the actions cannot be 
predicted or made intelligible by reference to beliefs and desires. According to 
DeLancey, the trouble is especially serious in the case of B-D postfunctional 
emotional actions, when the action continues even after it is no longer functional 
with regard to one’s beliefs and desires. 
In my presentation I defend interpretivism against DeLancey’s arguments. 
Interpretivism is not necessarily committed to cognitivism about emotions. I show 
that the interpretation of emotional action need not proceed from the narrow base of 
beliefs and desires. In addition, I elaborate how we could make sense of the idea that 
emotions cause actions on the interpretivist picture. 
 
Philosophy of Emotion’s Founding Myth:  
The Misreading of William James 
Christopher Murphy 
Keele University (UK) 
One could say that philosophy of emotion from the twentieth-century onwards is a 
series of footnotes to William James. Reactions for or against his theory of the nature 
of emotion, first outlined in his 1884 paper ‘What is an Emotion?’, have structured 
the range of positions in this entire sub-field in philosophy. The influence of his 
writing on emotion cannot be overstated but I wonder whether it wouldn’t be more 
accurate to say that misinterpretations of his work have been more influential than 
what James actually believed.  
In this paper, I argue that James's theory has been widely misunderstood as it 
has been taken out of the context of his overall psychological and philosophical 
theories. I first describe what I call the standard range of interpretations of James’s 
 theory, which have been embraced by a wide range of philosophers, psychologists, 
and other scholars. I argue that they make three interpretative mistakes in their 
readings. First, they treat the 1884 paper as a stand-alone piece instead of as a part of 
The Principles of Psychology published early. Second, they do not include James's 
views on the problem of consciousness, as expressed in The Principles. This book 
aimed to get around traditional distinctions, and ignoring it leads to a 
misunderstanding of James’ conceptual framework by using terms like ‘feeling’, 
‘perception’, ‘cognition’ in a way James would have rejected. Third, they ignore the 
history of ideas that informed and led up to his writing of The Principles.  
While there have been a few attempts to look again at James's theory, in whole or in 
part, such as Ellsworth (1994), Redding (1999/2011), Ratcliffe (2005), Hatfield (2007), 
and Southworth (2014) and that while these have been positive contributions, I argue 
that some of the pertinent details have been missed or not elaborated on enough by 
their various accounts.  
I argue that what James meant with his usage of key terms can be uncovered 
by looking in depth at The Principles of Psychology and some of his papers from 
around this period in his career, such as 'On the function of cognition' (1885). From 
this, I develop an interpretation of his theory at that time which I believe to be more 
accurate than the other accounts mentioned. I then discuss how replacing the 
standard account with a more accurate one may show that the traditional debates 
between cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and perceptualism in philosophy of emotion 
are based on certain questionable presuppositions about the mind and cognitions 
and this may, hopefully, lead some of them to being dissolved and making space for 
newer approaches.  
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 Structure of Affective Space 
Daniel Musil 
University of Hradec Kralove (Czech Republic) 
It is widely accepted that affective phenomena can last from very short episodes to 
long-lasting moods or even lifelong sentiments. On the one hand, These emotions 
can co-occur and exist without any relationship between them. On the other hand, 
they can be combined or melted into each other in many different ways. Moreover, 
there is broad consensus that these actual emotions can be very distinct in their 
nature and that they can even be differently valenced. As a result, we can experience 
them in many modes, for instance as distinct, combined, synchronized etc.  
Even though There has been a lot of philosophical work devoted to 
investigations of question where we can draw a boundaries of emotion in terms of 
spatial extension or spatial location, almost no reflection has been dedicated to the 
questions about temporal boundaries of emotions and about relationship between 
various affective phenomena which take place at the same time. Are emotions 
mutually exclusive? Where are the start and the end of affect? Are emotions discrete 
or do they blend together? What kind of relationship is between mixed emotions and 
feelings? In my paper, I will try to sketch possible answers to these questions by 
introducing the structure of affective space which enables to explain the 
arrangement of emotions and relations between them.  
Building on interdisciplinary research from variety of disciplines like 
neuroscience, philosophy of mind and psychology, I will argue that affective space is 
structured as multidimensional framework where affective phenomena with 
different temporal scope and various character and intensity are blended, mixed, 
fused or coexist together according to our own construction of these emotions and 
their relationships. That means, there is only one stream of affective experience, but 
this space is heterogeneous in its essence. In particular, I will claim that three stages 
constitute this space: First, we construct our emotion as an intentional mental state or 
process which can have a different duration (in fact, number of these constructions 
can be unlimited). It is necessary to point out, that some affective states are always 
present in this space. It is because of the fact that our mind is inherently affective, i.e. 
affectivity does not function as on/off matter. Secondly, relationships between 
concurrent emotions are constructed depending on the evaluation of past 
experience, relevance and context or situation. Thirdly, according to the attention we 
pay to these relations we can experience the actual state in many different forms (for 
instance Rafaeli et al. (2007) distinguish three different tendencies - synchrony, a-
synchrony, de-synchrony). 
 
 Interpersonally scaffolded affectivity: the social motivation approach 
Michiru Nagatsu 
University of Helsinki (Finland) 
 Mikko Salmela 
University of Helsinki (Finland) 
An influential approach in recent theorizing on collective and shared emotions 
analyses them within the Extended Mind framework as Extended Emotions (e.g. 
Krueger 2014, Krueger & Szanto 2016; Colombetti & Krueger 2015; Colombetti & 
Roberts 2015; León, Szanto & Zahavi 2017). The main idea is that, analogous to our 
use of tools for thinking, we construct affective niches with artefacts and other 
agents for regulating our feelings and emotions. A salient example is the handbag 
and its contents a woman carries (Colombetti & Krueger 2015). Slaby (2016) rightly 
criticizes the tendency of this approach to identify the individual as the autonomous 
‘user’ of external environments as her affective ‘resource’, without questioning how 
individual affective and mental states are constituted and constrained by 
environmental scaffolding, both social and physical. We use Slaby’s critique as our 
starting point, but add two novel contributions. First, we argue that to make 
progress in this debate we need explicit analysis of the function and mechanisms of 
interpersonally scaffolded affectivity because the important affective scaffolding 
(including material one) often involves other agents or anticipation of their reactions 
(Griffiths & Scarantino 2009). Second, we provide such analysis, drawing on the 
social motivation hypothesis (Anonymized 2014). The social motivation is a 
particular psychological disposition whose main role is to orient humans toward 
affiliative stimuli, which yield social reward and enable the formation of social 
bonds. The function and mechanism of social motivation, we argue, are the key not 
only to understanding how interpersonally scaffolded affectivity works but to 
evaluating whether or not a particular affective niche promotes individual and 
collective well-being. In particular, we suggest that our orientation toward affiliative 
stimuli is so basic that it is not amenable to individuals’ self-oriented instrumental 
regulation but rather susceptible to systematic manipulation resulting in reduced 
sense of individual well-being. The social motivation hypothesis provides a 
framework for studying such problematic niches, e.g. Slaby’s example of emails as 
the “mind invasion” or the “corporate life hack”, as well as niches that are genuinely 
conducive to personal and collective well-being. Using this framework, we briefly 
review several empirical studies on face-to-face vs. online social interactions and dis-
cuss their general design implications for interpersonal affective niche construction. 
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The dark side of the exceptional. On moral exemplars, character 
education, and negative emotions 
Ariele Niccoli 
University of Florence (Italy) 
 Maria Silvia Vaccarezza 
University of Genoa (Italy) 
Largely due to Linda T. Zagzebski’s seminal works on Exemplarist Moral Theory 
(2010, 2015, 2017), recent literature has seen a renewed interest in analyzing the role 
morally exceptional individuals play in our everyday moral lives, as well as the way 
they ground our moral judgements on virtues, values, and right actions. This new 
wave has also contributed to favor a retrieval of philosophical studies on positive 
moral emotions targeting moral exemplarity (see, e.g., Kristjansson 2017), and 
particularly admiration (Irwin 2015; Zagzebski 2015). From a character educational 
perspective, research on such emotions is proving particularly fruitful, in that it 
concerns the question of how they can be canalized so as to foster virtue acquisition 
(see, e.g., Sundari 2015; Croce and Vaccarezza 2017). 
The purpose of this paper is that of walking a different path, and focusing on 
the negative exemplarity-related emotions (NERE), and on their educational 
implications. If it is true that exemplars can inspire gratitude, moral awe, and 
admiration or elevation, it is also undeniable that confronting with one’s moral 
exceptionality may in some cases elicit negative emotions, such as jealousy, envy, 
embarrassment and shame. How, then, should educators deal with these reactions? 
Against Zagzebski (2017: 58-9), who sometimes takes NERE as obstacles to one’s 
moral growth, and therefore thinks educators should do their best to prevent them1, 
we claim they can be considered as significant dimensions of one’s moral growth, as 
 well as viable paths to virtue acquisition, which should be included in an 
educational process, rather than eradicated. 
In this paper, we will first provide an instrumental defense of negative 
emotions broadly conceived; secondly, we will elaborate two arguments in support 
of their intrinsic positive role; then, we will illustrate both kinds of role by analyzing 
three paradigmatic NERE: guilt, shame, and envy. Finally, we will conclude by 
elaborating a proposal to integrate NERE in a character-educational strategy. 
 
1Actually, Zagzebski’s analysis of envy is subtler than this. In particular, she distinguishes 
between benign envy for moral traits, which is morally valuable, and malign envy, 
which is taken to be a vice as it “prevents the acquisition of virtue […] because it 
makes emulation […] impossible” Zagzebski 2017: 55). All in all, she seems 
nonetheless quite skeptical about the positive value of negative exemplarity-related 
emotions, most of which she doesn’t even take into account: “I do not think that the 
exemplars I have chosen as exhibits in the next chapter are likely to produce hostile 
feelings or are controversial in other ways, but it would be interesting to find out 
which exemplars do produce such feelings, and how we ought to respond to that in 
social interactions and in education” (Zagzebski 2017: 59). 
 
The Morally Laden Emotions of Non-Human Animals Cannot Be 
Morally Assessed: a Reply to Mark Rowlands 
Karel Pajus 
University of Tartu (Estonia) 
Mark Rowlands defends in his book Can Animals Be Moral? (2012) the view that 
non-human animals can act morally because they can be motivated to perform 
actions for moral reasons. The moral reasons of animals take the form of morally 
laden emotions. Morally laden emotions are other-regarding emotions (e.g. 
compassion) with ‘identifiable moral content’ (e.g. “x’s suffering is unwarranted“). 
Animals who act for a moral reason are motivated by the evaluative and moral 
content of their other-regarding emotions. The affective part of the emotion provides 
the animal with a reliable ‘sensitivity’ to morally salient features of situations. 
Rowlands further insists that for animals to be moral agents in the proper sense of 
the term, their morally laden emotions have to be subject to moral assessment. This 
means that the emotions of animals are morally good or bad. Furthermore, if the 
emotions of animals are morally good or bad, then animals ought to act on their 
morally good emotions and ought not to act on their morally bad ones. I will criticize 
the view that the morally laden emotions of animals can exert this kind of normative 
pressure on animals by defending the, so called, Kantian control argument. 
According to this argument, metacognitive abilities engender control over emotions 
 and metacognitive control, in turn, is necessary for an emotion to exert normative 
pressure on its bearer. Since animals do not have metacognition, it follows that their 
emotions do not exert normative pressure on them. Thus, animals are not moral 
agents in the proper sense of the term. I will defend the Kantian control argument by 
showing that criticism of it is wrong. According to one objection, presented by 
Rowlands himself, animals do not require advanced metacognitive abilities to 
control their emotions because metacognitive abilities cannot engender control over 
emotions in the first place. For metacognitive capacities to confer control over 
emotions, metacognition would have to be itself under the agent’s control. 
Metacognition is, however, not under the agent’s control because it is subject to the 
same emotional influence. I will respond to this criticism by arguing, first, that 
control over emotions by exercising metacognition is possible even if metacognition 
is subject to emotional influence. I will further argue that even if perfect control over 
metacognition is absent, then control over emotion can still exist. Human beings are 
able to act continently, which as a type of imperfect metacognitive control. Animals 
lack continence and they do not therefore possess morally good or bad emotions that 
exert normative pressure on them. 
 
Pragmatism, phenomenology and the feeling body: James on emotion 
Heleen Pott 
Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) 
Without the body there would be no emotion, according to William James (1884) - 
emotions are ‘feelings of bodily changes’. This definition is commonly seen as the 
starting point of all modern theories of emotion. But what actually did he mean by 
‘feelings’ and how precisely is the body involved in experiencing emotions? Despite 
more than a hundred years of extensive debate there is no consensus on this issue. In 
the 20th century, James’s view was widely seen as compatible with a reductive 
version of scientific naturalism. He was criticized by philosophers (among them 
Wittgenstein and Sartre) for conceptualizing emotion as a non-intentional bodily 
sensation; psychologists argued that his theory could not account for the evaluative 
nature of emotions. In the 21th century, James’s view was defended and 
rehabilitated again by a wave of neo-Jamesian theories, among these Prinz (2004) 
and Robinson (2005), who praise James for his evolutionary grounded psychological 
theory of emotion as a non-cognitive ‘gut feeling’. From a quite different perspective, 
drawing on James’s later work, Ratcliffe (2008) argues that James’s view on emotion 
shows interesting similarities with ideas of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and that 
we should understand ‘feelings of bodily changes’ as ‘existential feelings’.  
In my paper I undertake an attempt to unify these two seemingly contrasting 
accounts of James’s ‘emotion’: on the one hand as a state of bodily arousal that leads 
 to conscious feelings, on the other as a structure through which the world is 
experienced. I will argue that the significance of James’s definition of emotion 
depends on his philosophical ideas, and that his phenomenological approach to 
feelings and emotions nicely fits with his naturalistic focus on physiological changes. 
Rereading James’s work in the context of his philosophical pragmatism can help 
clarify how his psychology anticipates an action-oriented understanding of emotion 
(Frijda 1986, 2007,and how his philosophy of mind is based on a view of 
consciousness as fundamentally affective, and an interpretation of the mind as 
radically embodied.  
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Reactive Sentiments and Fitting Attitudes 
Anna Réz 
Eötvös Loránd University (Hungary) 
Peter Strawson’s seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” has been subject to 
constant reinterpretations since its first publication in 1962. One of its major 
innovations was first pointed out by Gary Watson, who argued that the most 
original part of Strawson’s account concerns the “order of explanation” with regard 
to being and holding responsible: “Whereas traditional views have taken these 
attitudes (i.e., reactive attitudes such as guilt or gratitude) to be secondary to seeing 
others as responsible, to be practical corollaries or emotional side effects of some 
independently comprehensible belief in responsibility, Strawson’s radical claim is 
that these “reactive attitudes” (…) are constitutive of moral responsibility (Watson 
1987, pp. 259)” In a similar vein, R. J. Wallace has argued (1995), elaborating on 
Strawson’s theory, that there are no prior and independent facts about being morally 
responsible. Facts about responsibility come about by determining the conditions 
under which it is morally appropriate to hold someone morally responsible. 
 Recently, Patrick Todd (2016) and David Shoemaker (2017) advanced a 
different understanding of the Strawsonian approach. While Shoemaker offers a 
response-dependent account of moral responsibility, and Todd is highly skeptical 
about that very project, they both agree that the adequate interpretation of the 
Strawsonian “reversal” should be conceived analogously to response-dependent 
accounts of evaluative properties (such as e.g. funny). 
In my talk I first argue that we should distinguish the methodological-
conceptual claim put forward by Wallace (and presumably Watson) from the 
metaphysical thesis of Shoemaker and Todd. Wallace’s account is a general meta-
schema to understand the concept of responsibility and the theoretical debates 
surrounding it. The response-dependent account proposed by Shoemaker, by 
contrast, is a theory of moral responsibility itself. 
Second, by recognizing these differences in method and content we can shed a 
new light on Strawson’s original paper. Although the text itself is notoriously 
reticent in spelling out the relationship between reactive attitudes, moral demands 
and moral responsibility, it seems safe to assume that the response-dependent 
account proposed by Shoemaker is a useful amendment of the Strawsonian 
approach. Its major advantage is that it helps interpreting and illuminating 
Strawson’s much discussed and debated claim, i.e., that the practice of interpersonal 
expectations cannot and should not be “externally” justified. If the normative 
standards regulating the fittingness of our responsibility-attributing practices are 
internal to the practice itself, then it makes no sense to refer to more general 
metaphysical or normative principles to justify them. 
However, for the very same reason it is open to further discussion whether 
Wallace’s normative interpretation would or should be endorsed by a coherent 
Strawsonian account. Although strictly speaking the normative interpretation does 
not commit us to a non-naturalistic approach to moral responsibility, its main 
motivation runs afoul of naturalism. According to Wallace’s proposal, at the end of 
the day our moral norms will determine the conditions under which it is appropriate 
to hold someone responsible – and we have no reason to suppose that our norms 
regulating the fairness of responsibility attribution will pick out a naturally or 
metaphysically uniform set of properties. Thus, Wallace’s account leads to a 
conclusion contrary to Strawson’s original discussion: the final justification of our 
responsibility-attributing practices comes from an “external” source – from general 
moral norms and principles. 
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Emotional regulation and rationality 
Katherine Rickus 
Marquette University, Milwaukee (USA) 
Emotions are often evaluated on the basis of their perceived rationality, or their 
apparent lack of it. The relations that pertain between reason and emotion have a 
long history of discussion in philosophical inquiry and have, on the whole, been 
characterized as comprising some sort of conflict between the cognitive and the 
affective. This is variously characterized as an antagonistic relationship between the 
domains of reason(s) and feeling(s), thoughts and sensations, heads and hearts, the 
intellect and the gut, which ends up amounting to some likely conflict between “the 
thoughtful” and “the thoughtless”, and, consequently, between the “rational” and 
the “irrational” respectively. I will refer to this putative antagonism as the 
“cognitive-affective tension”, and hold its assumption responsible for greatly (and 
erroneously) influencing the evaluative attitudes we take towards emotions and 
emotional subjects, particularly rationality. 
In the course of this discussion, I hope to undermine the assumptions of the 
antagonistic relation, and in doing so to question the use of rationality in particular 
ways as an evaluative attitude applied to emotions and emotional subjects. I reach 
the following conclusion with respect to rationality: that emotions as the episodic 
affects described by philosophers are not the proper objects of assessment of 
rationality – rather, if we care to evaluate states and agents for rationality 
episodically we should assess our beliefs or our active responses to emotions as 
rational or not (on whatever model of rationality we take to be the most plausible or 
salient). Better still, we should evaluate emotions not as episodes, but as processual 
narratives, by evaluating the psychological causal history of an individual which 
leads to affect. This can lead to rationality having less force as an evaluative attitude 
about emotions, but as I indicated, if assessments of rationality remain desirable, 
there are other non-affective states more suited to this dimension of evaluation. This 
conclusion is derived from what I take to be one of the principal rational roles of 
emotion in the life of emotional subjects, that is the systematic autoregulation of 
emotion to aim at some tolerable affective ambience. 
 Affordances and Aesthetic Affectivity 
Tom Roberts 
 University of Exeter (UK) 
According to ecological theories of perception, there are essential links between the 
contents of a subject’s sensory experience and her capacities for embodied action. 
Visual experience, for example, picks out affordances: possibilities for behavioural 
engagement that depend upon how a subject’s environment is structured and 
populated, and upon her own skills, dispositions, and physiology.  
One popular way to understand the perception of affordances is to treat it as a 
fundamentally affective phenomenon. The world perceptually invites or solicits 
certain forms of practical interaction, and repels others, according to the agent’s 
needs and concerns – a door handle solicits grasping; an outstretched hand invites 
shaking; a deadly snake deters touching; and so forth.  
In this paper, I argue that the affective dimension of the perception of 
affordances is not limited to the solicitation of practical modes of behavioural 
engagement - that is, to actions carried out for the sake of some further goal of the 
agent. Sometimes, parts of the world call out to be engaged with for their own sake, 
or for the sake of their purely sensory and aesthetic properties. Objects and surfaces 
solicit haptic contact for the sake of their felt qualities, for example, while foods and 
drinks invite consumption for the sake of their taste.  
Moreover, there are everyday aesthetic qualities that are best understood, I 
suggest, in terms of an object’s perceptually soliciting actions of these kinds. A space 
is messy just in case it solicits tidying-up; a mark on a surface is a visual blemish just 
when it invites wiping-off; for a wine to be quaffable is for it to solicit continued 
consumption, and so forth. Embodied, concerned perceivers, then, are immersed in a 
world that affords not only complex varieties of practical engagement, but also rich 
forms of aesthetic and sensory appreciation. 
 
Epistemological Emotions. Voluptas and dolor as Criteria of Truth in 
Lucretius 
Chiara Rover 
Sapienza Università di Roma (Italy) 
As keys to access the ethical dimension, the two basic feelings or affections (ta 
pathe), namely pleasure (hedone) and pain (algedon), constitute the third criterion of 
truth envisioned by Epicurean canonics (DL X 31, 34). They are involved in the 
discrimination (krinesthai) of choices (haireseis) and rejections (phygai) (31), and 
therefore fall within those which Sextus Empiricus defines as “practical” criteria, as 
 opposed to “epistemological” ones (M VII 29). In order to function as “practical” 
truth criteria, however, pathe clearly require the contribution of logismos, which is 
crucial for the evaluation of pleasure and pain (Menec. 132). 
The present contribution argues that pathe deserve the title of criteria of truth 
even when they are considered in themselves, as something self-evident (enarges) 
and a-rational (alogos). At this “zero grade”, pleasure and pain constitute a sort of 
counterpart to sense-perceptions: in the Epicurean tradition, aisthesis never presents 
itself in a “neutral” form, but always with a sort of more or less pleasurable or 
painful undertone, depending on how well the porous structure of our sensory 
organs reacts to the impact caused by eidola. So even as more or less “automatic” 
consequences of aistheseis, pathe provide some information on reality, thereby 
operating as genuine epistemological criteria. They inform us about the degree of 
conformity and harmony an external object displays vis-à-vis our own atomic 
structure, even before we can assert anything at all about the identity of this object 
through the use of prolepsis, and hence logismos. 
Lucretius' position proves particularly crucial and revealing. If we examine all 
the various occurrences of the terms voluptas and dolor in De rerum natura, we will 
find some that appear to confirm the intrinsic epistemological value of the two 
affections or emotions. Pain is produced «where bodies of matter, by some force 
stirred up, / Through vitals and through joints, within their seats / Quiver and quake 
inside, but soft delight, / When they remove unto their place again» (DRN II, 963-
966). 
Even before any rational operation, these basic emotions – Lucretius' voluptas 
and dolor, and Epicurus' pathe – may rightfully be described as criteria of truth: a 
truth which is also at “zero grade” and which pertains to things rather than 
judgements, but which nonetheless possesses indisputable epistemological value. 
 
 
Painting as solid affective scaffolding 
Jussi Saarinen 
University of Jyväskylä (Finland) 
We humans continuously reshape the environment to alter, enhance, and sustain our 
affective lives. This two-way modification has been discussed in recent philosophy 
of mind as affective scaffolding, wherein ‘scaffolding’ quite literally means that our 
affective states are enabled and supported by environmental resources such as 
material objects, other people, and physical spaces (see e.g. Griffiths & Scarantino 
2009; Colombetti & Krueger 2015; Maiese 2016). In this paper, I will argue that under 
certain conditions the process of painting amounts to a noteworthy case of affective 
scaffolding. To expound this idea, I will begin with a theoretical overview of 
 affective niche construction and affective scaffolding. Then, based on the criteria of 
robustness, concreteness, and dependability, I will specify a solid form of affective 
scaffolding and propound painting as a cogent case of such. In support of my 
argument, I will highlight two feelings typical to painterly creativity: the feeling of 
aesthetic resonance and the feeling of fusion. To conclude, I will discuss the overall 
contributions and limitations of my account. 
My examination is motivated by a shortage of research on an important 
affective aspect of artistic creativity. While there has been much discussion about the 
ways in which artistic practice and its products may express or give form to artists’ 
feelings and emotions, considerably less has been said about artists’ active pursuit 
and attainment of certain affective states by way of the creative process. For many 
painters the activity of painting is not only about producing art or about giving form 
to experience, but also about setting up a niche in which certain affective states are 
enabled, realized, and valued. By examining painting from this point of view, I will 
illuminate the process of artistic creativity in a novel way, and at the same time, add 
nuance to our understanding of the nature of affective experiencing. 
 
 
Self-Stimulatory Loops of Affectivity and Ways of Scaffolding  
in the Recruitment of Radicalized Youth: A Comparative Study among 
different Radicalized Organizations 
Saad Saheed 
Osnabrück University (Germany)  
Hina Haq 
Osnabrück University (Germany) 
In the last few decades, the number of people who have been radicalized and joining 
the extremist organization has increased, particularly, the youth from all around the 
world are joining these organizations on an alarming rate. Affective bonding to these 
organizations is one of the most prominent aspects of the recruit’s personality. To 
better understand how the affective bonding during the recruitment of youth for 
radicalization works, it seems very promising to adopt new insights and 
developments from the field of situated cognition and affectivity, particularly the 
concepts of Affective Scaffolding and Self-Stimulatory Loops of Affectivity (SSLA). 
The two notions highlight both the intended structuring of the affective bonding by 
the recruiting organizations and the immersive influence these settings have on the 
individuals. The focus of affective bonding in this study would be on two main 
aspects, i.e. one on a personal level and second on an organizational level.  
 On a personal level of this affective bonding, the person who joins the 
organization develops an “affective self-stimulating loop” with it. The more they 
listen to the ideas the more they start relating to the words of their leader and their 
emotions develop with it. The same is with the training rituals and different other 
activities, which give a boost to the affective loop. This loop keeps the person in a 
specific affective state which leads them towards a deeper involvement in the 
organization or for the cause of the organization. The focus is to identify affective 
loops in the cases of the youth who have joined the radicalized organization. How 
do these loops get formed? Are there some common affective patterns for these 
loops?  
The second aspect is on the organizational level. Extremist organizations 
design themselves in a way that they provide niches for the young mind to scaffold 
with their ideas. The framework of Scaffolded Mind was introduced by Sterelny 
(2010). This concept of ‘Affective’ scaffoldings, helps to study in more detail the 
structure of radicalized organizations and what kind of niches they construct which 
act as scaffolding phenomenon for the young minds who join these organizations. 
The study investigates the affective structuring of the extremist organizations and 
how these organizations ‘affectively’ keep the concerned emotions elevated and 
cultivate them step by step, creating environmental niches which facilitate young 
people to emotionally scaffold to them.  
This study applies the theoretical structure of Affective Scaffolding and 
SSLAs to philosophical and empirical research and theories from different parts of 
the world. Especially, it covers Arabic, Hebrew, German, English and Spanish, 
literature to see whether the various radicalized organizations use more or less the 
same tools for Affective Scaffolding new recruits or whether they differ in important 
respects. The aim is to provide a broad theoretical perspective and to compare 
Eastern with Western philosophies of Radicalization and Affectivity. 
 
 
What is antipathy? 
Susanne Schmetkamp 
University of Basel (Switzerland) 
Whereas a lot has been written on empathy and sympathy, antipathy has been 
widely ignored in philosophy of mind, philosophy of emotion, and moral 
philosophy. Empathy is broadly understood as the sharing and understanding of 
mental states, especially emotions, of other beings in order to better understand 
what others feel and how it is like to feel that way from a certain perspective (for an 
overview Batson 2009; Coplan/Goldie 2011; Maibom 2017). Except for some more or 
less serious controversies concerning the process and outcome of empathy, there is 
 at least a broad agreement that empathy differs from sympathy and that the letter is 
a genuine moral emotion (Darwall 1998; De Sousa 2001). In sympathy – or 
compassion – we judge morally that another being is in an unfortunate or fortunate 
situation (and deservedly so) and we are motivated to promote the wellbeing of the 
other for the sake of the other (Ben Ze`ev 2000). Some argue that an adequate form of 
moral sympathy or compassion presupposes empathy. However, it is not at all clear 
whether this is a necessary condition and whether empathy might not also lead to an 
opposite emotion or emotional attitude, namely antipathy. Following everyday 
language antipathy seems to be a mere spontaneous reaction of disliking another 
person (or fictional character). In this case it is elicited by criteria of attraction, partly 
as signs of character traits. However, when we watch a fictional movie we 
experience that we not only sympathize with a fictional hero (and want her success) 
but that we at the same time feel antipathy for antiheroes and that this antipathy is 
not only based on dislike but on informed moral judgments. In case of ambiguous 
characters we might even feel both sympathy and antipathy for one and the same 
character. Moreover, according to the paradox of tragedy principle we take pleasure 
in antipathy (Plantinga 2009). We are not only interested in „good“ characters but 
also in bad ones; we cannot not only empathize and sympathize with them (the so 
called sympathy for the devil) but we will also side  against them and this is part of 
the aesthetic game. Obviously antipathy is more than a spontaneous reaction. Is it 
the antonym of sympathy? Is it based on empathy? Given that sympathy is a 
complex way of caring of other`s wellbeing which leads us to feel morally 
motivated: Could we, in turn, understand antipathy as a complex way of concern 
towards the uneasiness of others? I will answer this question positively and argue 
that antipathy is not only a spontaneous affect but also an attitude based on 
empathetic understanding and on moral judgements and that these judgments lead 
to the conclusion that the other should not get our compassion. 
 
 
Narrativity, Literature, and Moral Learning 
Markus Seethaler  
Graz University (Austria) 
The argument in my paper is twofold. First, I claim that narrativity plays a 
significant role in our self-understanding, although narratives do not play the role to 
unify our self or provide personal identity. Where narratives come into play is if we 
want to understand ourselves as persons. Second, I argue that one way to shape our 
personality is moral learning through literature. To do so, we need to emotionally 
engage in literary texts. 
 Narratives are important in our everyday life. For example, we often present 
memories in terms of first-person narratives, we engage in fictional narratives by 
reading literature or watching movies, and we are able to depict our life in the form 
of an autobiography. This has led to the theoretical claim that human beings always 
experience or should experience themselves as the authors of their own life and that 
we can only make sense of our self if we think of it in a narrative (for example 
Schechtman 2007). While it seems promising to argue, that narrativity and self-
understanding are connected, the exact formulation is crucial. If we expect 
narrativity to provide the unity for our self and personal identity, we run the risk of 
excluding many persons with a more episodic approach to their lives (see Strawson 
2004) or ignoring the fact that most life-narratives are fragments at best and far away 
from complete and unifying stories (see Lamarque 2004). I argue that instead we 
should follow the phenomenological tradition in differentiating the self and the 
person where the self is not something that can be separated from consciousness and 
first-personal givenness (see Zahavi 2007). In this framework, before we can even 
make sense of narratives we need to presuppose the self. Where the narrative in fact 
comes into play is if we want to make sense of us as persons, that can be shaped over 
time through our convictions, decisions and experiences. 
One way to shape our personalities through experience is to engage in 
literature. If the argument in the first section is correct and we do need some 
narrative account to understand ourselves as persons, it seems natural to consider 
literary texts. As well as my self-understanding as a person also literature has a 
narrative structure. Although, just to recognize a similarity in structure does not 
activate a process of moral learning. What we need as well is an emotional bonding 
to literary characters that enables us to fully understand their struggles and to relive 
their development. My point is that if we achieve this emotional bonding, we are in 
fact in a position to shape or redefine our own personality. The structural similarity 
enables us to explain our ability to achieve such an emotional engagement in the first 
place. 
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 “Whence does Good come? - Notes on Plato’s moral psychology” 
Gianluigi Segalerba 
Universität Wien (Austria) 
My contribution will be dedicated to the analysis of some aspects of Evil in Plato. 
The presence of an evil factor in men's soul is attested, for instance, in Republic IX, 
571b3-572b9, and in Republic 588b1-589b7. Plato asserts, among other things, that a 
component of our soul, at least while sleeping, does not omit any act of folly or 
shamelessness: human beings are capable of every crime. This predisposition is not 
accidental: on the contrary, it belongs to the very nature of men, since a terrible, 
savage, and lawless form of desires is present in every person, even in the seemingly 
most measured persons. This soul component appears to be a kind of “antireason”. 
Thus, men have in themselves emotions being able to destroy everybody and 
everything. 
On the basis of the description of the structure of the soul in Republic IX (and, 
to a certain extent, of Republic IV too), it does not seem, therefore, particularly 
difficult to explain the presence of Evil in the human dimension. It seems, on the 
contrary, rather difficult to explain the possibility of Good in the human dimension, 
since a good disposition of the soul does not seem so easy to be arrived at. 
Basing on different passages of Plato’s Republic, I would like to analyse in my 
contribution the following subjects: 
-  the presence of good and evil desires and pleasures in the soul; 
- the contrast between the rational part and the appetitive part together with 
the contrast between desires of the rational part and desires of the appetitive 
part; 
- the presence of Evil in each person, which is located in the appetitive part of 
the soul, the dangers that this part represents both for the individual and for 
every society, and the strategies proposed by Plato to put Evil in us under 
control; 
- the process of degeneration of a state and the causes of the death of a state in 
relation to the prevalence in a society and in the individual of the evil 
components; 
- the processes of individuals’ internalization of the bad conditions of a society 
and of individuals’ externalization of the bad conditions of the souls into a 
society; 
- the presence of Evil in the human history as a meta-historical presence rooted 
in the very structure of the men, independently of the particular historical age 
(we are the Evil, therefore the Evil will be always present in the human 
history). 
My thesis as regards the possible solutions offered by Plato in order to reach a 
liberation from the Evil will consist in interpreting the whole process of knowledge 
 described by Plato as a kind of indispensable therapy against the evil component 
present in each of us. I will mainly base my interpretation on passages of the 
Republic (especially from book IV, V, VI, VII and IX of the Republic); references to 
other works of Plato like Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus and the Laws will, 
however, be present in my analysis. A comparison with some passages of 
Thucydides (for instance, Melian dialogue and the pathology of war) will belong to 
my exposition. Likewise, I will analyse the similarities between Plato’s tripartition of 
the soul and Freud’s analysis of the structure of the soul with particular attention for 
Freud’s Todestrieb in the Es. 
In my presentation, I will first expose some arguments in favour of the 
existence of a strong tripartition of the soul (a point contested by some scholars, who 
say there actually is no tripartition of soul in Plato). I will then analyse Plato's 
description of the evil component as a factor capable of committing every kind of 
delict and crime. I will then proceed to the analysis of the desires/emotions that are 
connected by Plato, respectively, to the appetitive part and to the rational part of the 
soul. Plato assigns different pleasures, desires and ruling principles to the three parts 
of the soul. Emotions and desires belong not only to the appetitive part; a kind of 
desires does belong to reason too: contrast between reason and appetitive part also 
means and implies, therefore, a kind of contrast between desires belonging to reason 
and desires belonging to the appetitive part. 
My thesis regarding the structure of the human soul will be that, if we usually 
ask ourselves how Evil is possible, we, basing ourselves on the descriptions offered 
by Plato, had better ask whether and how the Good is possible. The description of 
the soul in Republic IX is anything but encouraging, since the evil component does 
not need a particular training in order to be active, whereas reason and 
emotions/desires belonging to reasons appear to need a long education. Moreover, 
Plato tells us that only a few men does manage to eliminate the evil component: the 
evil component apparently remains alive in the majority of people. The structure of 
the individual soul has immediate effects and immediate impacts for every state and 
every society, as we can see through the description of the degeneration and the 
decadence of the constitutions in the books VIII and IX of the Republic. Therefore, an 
analysis of the individual soul immediately represents, for Plato, an analysis of the 
strategies to be applied in order to guarantee the stability of every state. 
Only the long process of knowledge can free some individuals from the evil 
component that every individual has in himself. The knowledge of the realm of 
being opens up and makes accessible to the individual a new reality dimension: only 
this dimension can develop the potentialities of the rational part and can strengthen 
the desires of the rational part. Only this kind of development enables the individual 
to effectively contrast desires and passions of the appetitive part: Either philosophy 
or degeneration; either philosophy or victory of Evil. 
 Accordingly, as regards the structure of every society, only a class of 
individuals having had access to the alternative reality dimension is able to 
safeguard the structure of the state against the presence, in the majority of people, of 
an evil factor. 
In spite of every process of education, however, Plato does not seem to 
consider the Evil in us as a factor that can be totally defeated: Evil is, at least in the 
human dimension, not eliminable; men (the majority of men) are constitutively (also) 
evil. Every political constitution, every society will be, therefore, always exposed to 
the menace of a degeneration; Evil will always appear in human history (this 
independently of the particular historical moment), since Evil is rooted in the very 
structure of the men. 
 
‘One step further’ from moral evaluation to moral decision-making:  
A conceptual inference from the empirical evidence 
Aiste Seibokaite 
Eberhard Karls University Tübingen (Germany) 
 
A growing body of literature on psychological and neuroscientific studies has been 
investigating two kinds of moral judgments: moral evaluation and moral decision-
making. In philosophical terms, moral evaluation corresponds to moral 
appropriateness judgment from an observer’s perspective. Moral decision-making 
corresponds to deciding upon a course of action in a (usually) asymmetric sacrificial 
Trolley-type moral dilemma from an agent’s perspective. The psychological 
mechanisms involved in both evaluation and decision-making include (but are not 
limited to) value and outcome computation, cognitive reappraisal, emotional 
processing, attribution of mental states to others, empathy and harm aversion. 
This inquiry into the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms has 
served as input to cognitive theories on the role of affect and reason in moral 
judgment. However, conceptual consideration of the process of moral judgment 
itself is scarce in the cognitive science literature, yet a common question in meta-
ethics. What steps do we take to reach a moral appropriateness judgment? How do 
we come to a decision in a dilemma situation? 
In this article, I argue that moral decision-making is only ‘one step further’ 
from moral evaluation. In my view, moral evaluation consists of the following steps: 
1. Witnessing an action that might belong to the moral domain, 2. Accessing 
personal moral knowledge (either on moral norms or beliefs about morally 
significant outcomes), 3. Assessing the degree of moral significance of the action in 
question, 4. Ascribing moral appropriateness. Moral decision-making in a dilemma 
situation is conducted in the following steps: 1. Encountering a choice that might 
 belong to the moral domain, 2. Evaluating one horn of dilemma (going through the 
steps of moral evaluation process), 3. Evaluating the other horn of dilemma (going 
through the steps of moral evaluation process again), 4. Using moral imagination to 
decide upon the course of action. 
I develop my argument for ‘one step further’ difference by considering 
empirical evidence from neuroimaging studies on moral judgment. A recent meta-
analysis showed that moral evaluation and moral decision-making differ only by the 
additional activation of one brain region during decision-making tasks: the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Garrigan et al., 2016). Together with activation in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) it constitutes the core of the mentalizing 
network. Involvement of these two regions may suggest the underlying neuronal 
correlate of the ‘one step further’ regarding a moral decision, as well as different 
involvement of vmPFC in moral evaluation and moral decision-making.  
In neuroimaging studies, the mentalizing network is assumed to be 
responsible for considering social cues of complex social situations. Within this 
network, the TPJ integrates temporary beliefs and intentions (goals), while vmPFC 
infers from long-term stable character traits (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van 
Overwalle, 2009; Lombardo et al., 2011; Bzdok et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012). Given 
the ascribed roles of these two regions we may assume that the ‘one step further’ is 
expressed as a process of moral imagination. Mavis Biss’ radical moral imagination 
account, which considers imagination as a creative re-thinking of social expectations 
on moral behaviour and personal character traits, fits best, considering the current 
empirical evidence on the role of affect and cognitive reasoning in moral judgment. 
Finally, I conclude my article with an overview on how my account on moral 
evaluation and moral decision-making benefits other cognitive theories by 
identifying the conceptual steps of the processes, in which interaction between 
affective and cognitive reasoning could result in behavioural differences. 
 
Emotions and Self-deception 
Zeynep Talay-Turner 
Istanbul Bilgi University (Turkey)  
‘Human beings are rational creatures, but we also have emotions.’ Saying ‘but’ 
already implies that rationality excludes emotions. Robert Solomon calls this ‘the old 
prejudice’ according to which emotions belong to the irrational part of our psyche, 
and are disruptive. In his tripartite structure of the psyche Plato, for instance, claims 
that in order to live a virtuous life our reason should rule over our passions and 
desires. Stoics go even further claiming that passions need to be avoided at all cost, 
however, saying this they do not suggest a division between rationality and 
irrationality: there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and cognition and 
 this is what the following Stoic saying is about: ‘behind all your emotions, there is a 
judgment, albeit a false one’ (Chrysippus). According to this, we may change our 
judgment about a particular issue and thus be liberated from an unwanted emotion, 
be it jealousy, envy, fear and so on. This Stoic theory of the passions, has attracted 
many contemporary philosophers of emotions, and given rise to the so-called 
evaluative tradition (C.D. Broad, Errol Bedford, Anthony Kenny, Lazarus, Robert 
Solomon, Nussbaum). 
In the first part of my paper I investigate the relationship between emotions 
and cognition and show how emotions are constituted by and/or are dependent on 
evaluative judgments. Here I mostly focus on compassion, and claim that since 
evaluative judgments cannot be separated from social values, compassion itself is a 
socially constructed emotion, or at least has a socially constructed dimension in it. 
Then, I claim that if emotions are constituted or structured by judgments, then any 
suspension of judgment (Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or 
an emotion-free state. And here I am interested in the ethical consequences of such a 
state, namely that with the suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is 
much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of 
accountability. One dimension of this problem is self-deception. I examine this via a 
particular literary genre, namely, auto-biography, or as recent studies claim, auto-
fiction. In this final section I look at Albert Speer’s memoirs and claim that his self-
deception was a result of a suspension of judgment. 
 
Being Emotional About Possibilities 
Andres Thomas  
Durham University (UK) 
It is common for us to say things like “I am worried about my exam tomorrow”, “it 
makes me sad to think about the death of my close friend (who is still alive)”, or “I 
pity Anna Karenina”. Expression of emotions towards the future, counterfactuals 
situations, and fictional characters are troubling cases for theories of emotion which 
require our emotional attitudes to have an aspect of intentionality, that is to say, they 
require our emotions to be about something. The future is yet to come, 
counterfactual situations have not actually happened, and fictional characters are not 
real people. So, in these cases what are our emotions about, and how can we satisfy 
the intentionality condition? These concerns have led some philosophers down a 
Meinongian route, arguing that it is possible for us to express emotions and other 
intentional attitudes toward non-existent entities. However, other philosophers 
argue that the metaphysics that accompanies a Meinongian theory are deeply 
unattractive.  
 In this presentation, I will argue for a middle way. I will argue that these 
situations should be thought of as cases of emotions about possibilities rather than 
cases of emotions about non-existent events or people. This method I think will ease 
some of the Meinongian concerns about emotions and non-existence, but it also 
comes without the worrying metaphysics that anti-Meinongians find hard to 
swallow. To achieve this, I will argue along lines inspired by David Lewis (1986). I 
advocate the view that possibilities are fleshed out possible worlds not dissimilar to 
our own. The events of these worlds are the objects of our emotions and the subjects 
of utterances concerning the future, counterfactuals, and fictional characters.  
However, I will also point out that in order to reap the functional benefits of 
my proposal we do not necessarily need to succumb to the ontological commitments 
of Lewisian possible worlds. I will suggest that at the very least we can solve this 
puzzle with a fictionalist view of possible worlds. I will conclude that we can lift 
some of the pressure of these cases about emotions towards non-existence and 
provide a partial solution to the Meinongian question about how we can have 
emotions towards non-existent objects without committing to an unpopular 
ontology. We can enter into “imaginative-games” set against a background of 
Lewisian possibility in order to account for our emotional reactions to the future, 
counterfactuals, and fictional characters.  
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The «nauseating» Being. 
Proximity and Shapelessness Revealing Contingency:  
The Influence of Aurel Kolnai on Jean-Paul Sartre 
Giorgia Vasari 
Sapienza University of Rome (Italy) 
The objective of this paper is to consider the potential impact of Aurel Kolnai’s essay 
Der Ekel (1929) on Jean-Paul Sartre’s thought, with emphasis on Sartre’s description 
of the contingency of existence, revealing itself in the emotional experience of 
«nausea» (1938-1943). In fact, critics tend to support the idea of Sartre being a reader 
of Kolnai’s work and, therefore, the hypothesis of an influence of Kolnai on some 
parts of Sartre’s philosophy. In this perspective, I argue that shapelessness and 
proximity to the shapeless object – considered by Kolnai as basic features of the 
disgusting object and disgust – are the most important characteristics of the 
contingency of Being in Sartre. 
 According to Kolnai, proximity is «a concept that acquires a central position 
for the problem of disgust» because it’s «not merely an occasion» but «also a 
concurrent object of the disgust»1. Indeed, being disgusted is a matter of intimate 
contact with an object deprived of its shape, therefore an aggressively «sticky» 
object. Moreover, disgusting substances are often «viscous» and «soft»; sweet taste 
«can most easily become disgusting, since it is just the moment of sweetness that 
forms the basic tonality of what one might call a self-consistent, undemarcated and 
formless, insipidly agreeable taste»; disgusting animals are «vermin-like», «lithe» 
and characterized by «their crawling stickiness». From an intentional point of view, 
the disgusting object adheres to the subject wrapping it and leaving it no escape. 
But, through this aggression the subject doesn’t fear death, as death itself 
resides in this «surplus of life», in this «macabre debauchery of matter». Therefore, 
the matter lack of structure and order reveals a lack of sense in life, which leads to 
disgust. 
The main question of Sartre’s early philosophy is the contingency of existence, 
its lack of essence. The nonsense reveals itself to consciousness and consciousness – 
which is contingent too – builds itself on the surface of Being-in-itself, adhering to it. 
However, because of its freedom, 
consciousness has the power to free itself through creation, and its goal is to found 
the «value»2: a meaningful reality. But the contingency of Being-initself can turn into 
«antivalue», «absorbing» consciousness in «indifference»: this is the «slimy», the 
«stickly-sweet revenge» of Being-initself. 
The «slimy» dissolves consciousness, haunting it but not making it fear death. 
These contents of L’être et le néant (1943) represent the core of La nausée (1938). In 
this novel, the hero suffers from frequent nauseas until he becomes «Nausea»3 
himself, facing the aggressive contingency of a frightening existence in its «obscene 
nudity»14. This revelation (in the public park) is characterized by the semantic field 
of fullness, softness, shapelessness and proximity, as well as the presence of 
disgusting animals like the snake and the larva: «the diversity of things, their 
individuality» reveals itself as mere «appearance» melting like «veneer» and leaving 
only «soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder», in a «flaunting abundance». The 
essential «pure and rigid lines» (like in «the circle») don’t exist in this world, in 
which there only exists a «fundamental absurdity»: «that ignoble marmalade». 
Therefore, «the essential thing is contingency». 
 
Notes 
1A. Kolnai, On 1 Disgust, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle 2004, p. 40. 
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 Re-emergence of affectivity  
in the democratic politics of the post-truth era 
Tõnu Viik 
Tallinn University (Estonia) 
I will claim that the political era that we sometimes call “post-truth” phase of 
democracy is best described as a change in the (discursive) rules of contemporary 
democratic practices. New ways of making politics started to involve both archaic 
and new forms of collective affectivity. By collective affectivity I mean communally 
shared, or social, emotions. Collectively shared emotions are intersubjective feelings 
that are validated and brought to existence by either an imaginative or real presence 
of other subjects. Quite often common moods are experienced as joint states of mind 
that unite the subjects who feel the same way into a group with its specific 
communal identity. The paper attempts a phenomenological description and 
explanation of shared emotions, as they are in play of the post-truth politics. I will 
argue that the new populism provokes successfully a type of enjoyment that is 
similar to the Lacanian notion of jouissance. Even if a particular populist agenda fails 
to solve a particular problem it addresses, it still brings about a communal feeling 
that currently prevailing ways of policy-making are not dealing with the problems in 
the way “we” desire. What “we” desire is a non-alienated, authentic way of politics 
that proceeds from the heart of the Volksgeist, is carried out by uncorrupted and 
unstained father-figures, and would produce a uniform agreement and a warm 
sense of support between each member of the political community. 
 
Patheme: understanding historical change through affectivity 
Erik Wallrup  
Stockholm University (Sweden) 
A change of emotional behaviour or within an emotional culture is often seen as a 
consequence of overarching transformations of the social order, so for instance by 
Norbert Elias. This paper suggests instead that an affective shift (to use a both 
broader and more far-reaching term than ‘changes in emotional behaviour’) within 
society is always related to a new world disclosure. ‘World’ is here understood in 
general terms as the interrelations through which meaning is created, as a cultural 
configuration, or, in the special case of the work of art, an aesthetic configuration 
that may interact with the cultural configuration. Both Martin Heidegger’s 
conceptions of ‘world’ (especially those in Being and Time and ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’) and Nikolas Kompridi’s socially related reformulation of ‘world 
disclosure’ are vital here.  
 With his point of departure in the concept of ‘episteme’, Michel Foucault has 
shed light upon the conditions of possibility of knowledge during particular epochs 
such as the Renaissance, the Classical Age and the modern period. As shown by 
Michael Schwartz, Foucault’s notion of different epistemological epochs is intimately 
related to Heidegger’s History of Being (Seinsgeschichte) in which Being is given but 
also refused in different ways through history. Something in Heidegger that, 
however, is absent in Foucault’s historiography is the affective element. Through 
introducing the concept of ‘patheme’, an affective parallel to Michel Foucault’s 
‘episteme’, I intend to open up a new perspective on historical change where affec-
tive traits are not held to be caused by political, social or epistemological circum-
stances. Whereas the ‘episteme’ defines the condition of possibility of knowledge, 
the ‘patheme’ is the affective condition of any historically given worldhood.  
Accordingly, the ‘patheme’ is decisive for how man relates to the surrounding 
world, it conditions human reflection and action, and it makes itself known in art in 
an eminent way. The ‘patheme’ can therefore not be reduced to theories of affectivity 
(such as Descartes’s theory of passions), but stands in a reciprocal or even 
determinative relationship to such theories. To give an example, already discussed 
by William M. Reddy in terms of an ‘emotional regime’, the French Revolution did 
not have an affective shift as one of its consequences; instead, the affective shift that 
got it fullest description in the writings of Rousseau (both the political and literary 
ones) preceded and conditioned the revolutionary upheaval and outcome. Another 
example: the free-flowing affectivity of today cannot be explained by social media, 
but should be understood from the perspective of an affective shift lying as far back 
as the 1960s. ‘Patheme’ is key to such an approach. 
 
Appropriate Hate 
Lauren Ware 
University of Kent (UK) 
This paper has two aims. The first is to provide an argument for a new account of 
hate as an affect distinct from anger, disgust, and contempt. The second is to provide 
an argument as to how hate is, in certain cases, the appropriate and justified 
response to an object. 
Hate, we will argue, is an attitude characterised by a desire to eliminate its 
object. This can take a variety of forms depending on the kind of object. For created 
objects such as art, architecture, or technology, hate is characterised by the desire 
either that these objects had never been made in the first place, or that these objects 
would be destroyed. For groups of people, hate is characterised by a desire to dis-
solve or disestablish the object group. For individuals, hate is to desire either that the 
 person was never born, or would cease to exist, or that their identity should be 
erased. 
Demonstrating how hate, on our account, is neither equivalent to—nor a form 
of—anger, disgust, or contempt, we make three sub-arguments for this account. The 
first is that when making a hate claim, there is always an eliminative connotation. 
For example, if one were to say, ‘I hate brutalist architecture’, this claim can be 
reasonably interpreted as a claim about that person’s desire to see all brutalist 
architecture removed, or that they wish it had never been built in the first place. 
The second argument rests on the methodology of hate groups and/or hate 
ideologies. Misogyny, xenophobia, racism, homophobia, and transphobia are 
manifested through silencing, exclusion, and historical, experiential, and cultural 
erasure, as well as bodily violence directed at individual members of these groups. 
The eliminative character of hate manifested in these cases not only includes the 
attempt to destroy individual members of the group, but also to destroy their ability 
to function as a group. 
Thirdly, we look at examples where one attempts to correct the hate claim of 
another. For example, one might sincerely claim, ‘I hate it when it rains!’. We might 
well imagine that someone else might try to correct that person, by demonstrating 
that rain is valuable, and that the speaker would miss it (for life and death reasons) if 
it were to disappear. Given that these correctives appeal to the value of the existence 
of the object of the hate claim, this suggests that a genuine hate claim is one about 
the lack of perceived value in the existence of the object. 
We will then go on to argue that despite the deeply problematic cases of hate, 
and claims that hate is always inappropriate, there are cases where hate is the 
appropriate thing to feel, justified either morally, politically, aesthetically, 
epistemically, or by the context’s given normative domain. Such examples will be 
any case where the object, group, ideas, or even individuals should justifiably cease 
to exist, or at least, be justifiably desired never to have come to be in the first place.  
That is, despite some misgivings about hate, it can be, and has been, a motivator for 
good, and therefore should not be something to be avoided at all costs. 
 
Can a Robot be Your Friend? Emotions towards Artificial Intelligence 
Eva Weber-Guskar  
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen (Germany) 
What happens if intelligent machines rather than other humans become partners in 
our interactions – as it is already increasingly the case? Examples of this begin with 
intelligent personal assistants like Siri and extend to autonomous cars and the 
robotic seal “Paro” who is used for people with dementia. The rise of these new 
“actors” challenges our understanding of emotions. We can distinguish at least three 
 questions: Can we have real emotions towards them or only pseudo-emotions? Is it 
not appropriate to have such emotions even if we can? And if we can have real and 
appropriate emotions in such cases, are these perhaps new types of emotions? 
This paper concentrates on the second question and on one type of emotions: 
the emotion of sympathy (a positive, pleasant attitude towards someone that is 
bound up with the motivation to spend time with that someone etc.; to be 
distinguished from empathy and from the way David Hume and Adam Smith 
would use the word). Neuronal networks as self-learning systems based on powerful 
processors and a huge amount of data can interact in a rather “autonomous”, flexible 
and individually personalized way. Furthermore, they recognize emotions and 
imitate their expression with the consequence that a kind of emotional exchange is 
possible in the interaction with them. The question put more precisely is: Is it 
necessary that both sides feel emotions (that is “have emotions”) in order for the 
involved emotions to be appropriate? Is it, therefore, for example, not appropriate to 
have sympathy towards Jibo, the new language assistant and table robot that not 
only turns light and music on and off and orders your groceries but that also talks to 
you and cheers you up with a joke if you are in a bad mood? 
I want to argue that there are at least some reasons to deny this question. 
First: Whereas pity (that has been discussed for this question so far) indeed 
presupposes the existence of emotions at the other side because it is an emotion that 
is by definition directed at an emotion (or at least feelings), namely some sort of pain 
or negative emotion, sympathy does not so. Second: In interactions with humans we 
do not find it necessarily inappropriate to have sympathy towards someone who 
does not  have any emotions towards us. We might develop this emotion just by 
observing someone interacting with other people. Third: While emotions as thank-
fulness or resentment are bound up with the belief that the object of the emotion is 
responsible for its actions sympathy is not so. We hold sympathy towards babies, 
who cannot act responsibly, to be completely appropriate. This is way the fact that 
artificial intelligence is not in the strict sense autonomous is not relevant for the 
question of the appropriateness of sympathy. To sum up: While there are obvious 
reasons for the belief that other emotions concerning artificial intelligence are not 
appropriate, it is rather hard to find those reasons for the emotion of sympathy.  
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 Emotions as Categorical Bases 
Demian Whiting 
University of Hull (UK) 
A standard view in metaphysics has it that dispositional properties of objects have 
categorical or causal bases, properties of objects that ground or explain the way 
objects are disposed to behave when certain circumstances obtain (see e.g. D. 
Chalmers 2010). But if this is true of objects in general, then the same must be true of 
people specifically. So the question arises: what in the case of ourselves might play 
the role of a categorical basis for our behavioral dispositions?  
I will argue that emotion is the best candidate – indeed it turns out to be the 
only viable candidate – for the categorical basis for our behavioral dispositions. In 
other words, I will argue that we are disposed to behave in the ways we do in virtue 
of the emotions we undergo. I argue that desires and beliefs are not suitable 
candidates, desires because they are behavioral dispositions and therefore not suited 
to act as categorical bases, and beliefs because they are the stimulus or triggering 
conditions for our behavioral dispositions. I then outline a number of reasons for 
why emotions seem very well suited to play the role of categorical bases. In 
particular, I show how emotions’ phenomenal qualities – the edgy quality that is 
distinctive of fear, or the irritable or hot-headed quality distinctive of anger say – can 
explain how we are disposed to behave when encountering the world and its objects. 
A striking upshot of the argument is that the widely-held view that beliefs and 
desires alone explain everything there is to explain about behavior – the so-called 
folk-psychological model of human behavior – turns out to be false. For emotion in 
addition to desire and belief has an essential and distinctive role to play in the 
explanation of human behavior.  
 
Chalmers, D. 2010. Consciousness and its Place in Nature. Oxford University Press. 
 
The expression of agent-regret 
Jake Wojtowicz 
Kings College London (UK) 
I aim to develop our understanding of agent-regret and its expression by looking at 
the relation between agent-regret and reasons for action. Drawing on some 
forthcoming work by John Gardner, R Jay Wallace’s recent work on regret, but 
mostly on Bernard Williams’s characterisation of the emotion, I bring out how the 
expression of agent-regret differs from the expression of ordinary regret. 
 I begin by sketching a basic picture of agent-regret, contrasting it with 
ordinary regret. Roughly, agent-regret involves lamenting what I have done, 
whereas regret involves lamenting what happened.  
I then introduce Bernard Williams’s claim that someone who feels agent-
regret would not be satisfied by an insurance pay-out to the victim, whereas such a 
pay-out would satisfy someone who felt ordinary regret. Hence, agent-regret’s 
particular expression.  
I argue that we can understand this lack of satisfaction if we see that regret 
gives us a reason to make things better, whereas agent-regret gives us a reason to 
make up for what we have done. This reason is present because if we see something 
as lamentable we tend to have a reason to fix it. When it comes to regret we lament 
what happened, whereas when we feel agent-regret we regret what we have done; 
thus agent-regret involves a reason to fix what we have done: to make amends.  
I illustrate this with the following case. Margot breaks Christina’s vase, 
knocking it over as she walks down a corridor. She feels agent-regret. Alice, a 
bystander with no involvement in the breakage, regrets that the vase smashed. Still, 
Alice has reason to act: “The vase smashed” is a fact, and it counts in favour of 
buying Christina a new vase. I further expand on the relation between regretting a 
lamentable occurrence and the awareness of reasons to fix it. 
But Alice does not have reason to do anything more than repair the damage 
done to Christina’s vase, and the smashed vase does not speak in favour of Alice-in-
particular fixing it. She has no reason to help Christina if an insurance company has 
already paid out and replaced the vase because what she laments has been repaired.  
How might Margot make up for what she has done? In the simplest case, she 
might fix the vase herself. Both Alice and Margot might try to fix the vase, and in 
doing so conform to their reasons to act; but the reason why they act differs – Alice 
wants to make things better, Margot wants to make up for what she has done. To 
properly understand this expression, we need to understand the reasons in play, 
rather than just the actions performed. Margot feels the need to do something even if 
someone else has repaired the vase, because she has not conformed to her reason to 
make amends. I argue Margot can make amends by instantiating the values 
damaged by what she regrets doing. So, she might buy Christina flowers for the 
vase, enhance the beauty in her life, and partly make amends. 
 
 
 Collective Regret and Collective Obligations 
Bill Wringe 
Bilkent University (Turkey) 
In his 1985 book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams invoked the 
possibility of 'a way of doing moral philosophy that started from the ways in which 
we experience our ethical life. Such a philosophy would reflect on what we believe; 
feel; take for granted; the ways in which we confront obligations and recognize guilt 
and responsibility; the sentiments of guilt and shame. It would involve a 
phenomenology of ethical life.' Williams observes that such a philosophy 'could be a 
good philosophy'; but the subjunctive mood governing his remark suggests that he 
regards the possibility as non-actual. In this paper, I aim to try to bring the 
counterfactual closer to actuality by investigating some of the ways in which a kind 
of ethical phenomenology might have a bearing on considerations about collective 
obligation.  
Williams mentions, as examples of experiences on which his 'phenomenology 
of ethical life' might take as material for reflection, certain kinds of moral emotion – 
in particular, 'the sentiments of guilt and shame.' Here, I shall focus on a particular 
variety of a different, but closely related emotion – that of moral regret. I shall be 
discussing what we might call 'collective moral regret', and in particular a from of 
collective moral regret related to omissions.  
I shall argue that in order to understand some instances of collective moral 
regret we must take ourselves to be committed to the possibility of there being 
collective obligations which fall on groups which are not agents. This conclusion 
runs counter to much recent work on the nature of collective obligations. However it 
is of interest for a number of reasons. Most prominent among them is that it opens 
up the possibility of obligations which fall on one particular non-agent collective: 
what one might call the 'global collective', consisting of the world's population as a 
whole. 
I shall argue as follows: first, I shall describe some situations which I take to 
call for collective moral regret. I shall then investigate this response in more detail, 
arguing for three claims: first, there is a prima facie case for thinking this response is 
a rational and appropriate – but not obligatory - response to the situations described; 
secondly, that the rationality of the response presupposes the existence of certain 
kinds of collective obligation; and thirdly, that the rationality of the response does 
not presuppose the existence of a collective agent on whom those obligations fall. 
Finally, I shall consider whether the idea of collective obligations which fall on non-
agents is simply incoherent and whether I have placed more argumentative weight 
on the deliverances of phenomenology than they can bear. 
 Fighting Fire with Fiero:  
How Pride Can Lead to Overcoming Temptation 
Jumana Yahya 
Osnabrück University (Germany) 
The self-control literature rarely treats emotions as a phenomenon that is useful for 
sticking with one’s commitments and better judgments. Most self-control theorists 
categorize an emotion as a compelling force, which, at worst, must be avoided at all 
costs, and, at best, can be utilized only by the clever. For those compelling emotions, 
which can potentially be repurposed to serve self-control, only the positive emotions 
seem to be discussed. Moreover, only low-arousal emotions are typically accepted as 
useful for successful self-control. In light of a recent trend to conceive self-control as 
a situated phenomenon (Heath & Anderson, 2010; Hung & Labroo, 2011), the time 
has come to reconsider the role that emotions can (and do) play in self-control. 
Empathy, for example, has been associated with the ability to delay gratification 
(Soutschek et al., 2016). 
The aim of this paper is to argue that emotions deserve to be bona-fide 
members of the self-control system. More specifically, this paper will suggest a 
candidate for a self-controlling emotion, namely, fiero. Fiero – a term coined by the 
psychologist Isabella Poggi – refers to a version of pride, which is experienced when 
an agent triumphs over a great challenge. Aristotle treats pride as a very important 
emotion, and claims that “a person is proud if he both is and thinks himself to be 
worthy of great things”. The intuition that this paper develops, following Aristotle, 
is that pride can lead to great things, which are, in this context, sticking to one’s 
better judgments.  
The interesting thing about fiero, or pride in general, is that the expression of 
this emotion is innate (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008), and that this emotion motivates 
the desire to overcome additional challenges. Furthermore, if something like the 
facial feedback hypothesis is true, which states that mimicking a facial expression 
can induce the relevant emotion in an agent, then fiero can potentially be induced by 
mimicking the behavioral markers of this emotion (i.e., clenched fists, raised arms, 
fierce face, etc.). Taken together, these suggestions indicate that inducing a feeling of 
fiero might be sufficient to motivate an agent to overcome strong temptation and be 
successfully self-controlled. 
 Embodied Emotion and Cultivating Embodied Virtues 
Sunny Yang 
Hankuk University, Seoul (South Korea) 
In this paper, I show that cognition and bodily feeling are not distinct in emotion. I 
argue that the pure cognitive theory of emotion, which identifies emotion with 
evaluative judgment or belief, is inadequate. The main objection to standard pure 
cognitive theory is that it cannot explain the non-cognitive aspects of emotion. I 
argue that if we have to take an adequate account of what is essential to being an 
emotion, we must resist the false choice between pure cognitive theories and pure 
somatic, bodily feeling theories. In order to do this, I suggest that we should take an 
account of “how emotions can be sophisticated cognitive states and, at the same 
time, have bodily feelings as a major component” (Ratcliffe 2008, 17). 
I first of all consider Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal theory’. The theory, on the 
one hand, agrees with pure somatic, bodily feeling theory in the sense that emotions 
are embodied, and disagrees with the feeling theory in the sense that judgments are 
needed for emotion elicitation(Prinz 2003:81). According to Prinz, emotions are 
“structurally simple embodied states, but they carry the kind of information that 
full-blown cognitions can carry.” (Prinz 2003: 82)  
However I raise an objection to this embodied appraisal theory. I argue that 
Prinz cannot explain cultivating embodied virtues: how we might educate our 
emotions and cultivate virtues. Prinz explains how and where emotions can get in 
on the act by utilizing notion of ‘valence markers’, which are reward and punish-
ment markers. It is an unconscious mechanism that exerts influence on behaviour. 
The advantage of taking this model is that it could be tested by seeking biological 
evidence that emotional valence is systematically related to brain systems associated 
with reinforcement and punishment, which have been independently investigated.  
Finally, I present an alternative account of Prinz’s embodies appraisal theory 
in order to explain educating our emotions and cultivating virtues. D. Hutto is 
actively developing an alternative, enactive understanding of emotions that 
conceives of emotional responsiveness as non-representational and embodied in 
ways that go beyond the head (see Colombetti 2013; Hutto, Kirchhoff & Myin 2014). 
His radically enactive account of emotions conceives of them in terms of 
dynamically unfolding interactions with, rather than representations of, the world 
(Hutto 2008; Hutto 2012; Hutto & Myin 2013). Following Hutto’s lead, I attempt to 
apply this conception of the emotions to explain how we might educate our 
emotions and cultivate virtues (Hutto & Sánchez-García 2015).  
I suggest taking a holistic stance where skills, cognition, and emotion are not 
decoupled and isolatable but rather, fully embodied processes meant to work 
together. I argue that a holistic integration is something to be accomplished within 
the context of a social practice. 
